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3 SUMMARY
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness. Joint Self-Assesment Report. Helsinki, Finland 
2008. 53pp. (Reports of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, ISSN 1236-2115; 
2008:2) ISBN 978-952-00-2516-8 (PDF)
Representatives of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC), the EU Commission and the WHO/European Region acquainted them-
selves with Finland’s pandemic influenza preparedness from 12 to 15 June 2007. 
The aim of the visit was to investigate the degree of Finland’s preparedness for a 
pandemic, identify its strengths and development objects and encourage national 
experts to continue and share the work with other EU member states. A corre-
sponding assessment is under way in other European countries. 
On the basis of the visit the ECDC experts drew up together with the national 
experts a report with proposals for measures Joint Self-Assessment Report on the 
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness in Finland, June 2007.
The ECDC’s report describes the situation in Finland’s pandemic preparedness 
in summer 2007. The national preparedness plan for a pandemic influenza was 
completed towards the end of 2006. In connection with its publication, a number 
of information and education events were arranged in all the special responsibility 
districts at which representatives of the hospital districts were present. Thereafter 
the hospital districts have drawn up preparedness plans of their own. 
According to the main observations in the ECDC’s report the greatest challenge 
for Finland is how to develop the national and regional instructions into applica-
tions that also function at the municipal level. The ECDC estimates that it will 
demand a couple of years of intensive work. The most important proposals for 
continued measures in the report concern the continuity and coordination of the 
national preparedness planning, as well as the operationality of the regional and 
local level plans. The report also stresses the importance of coordinating the pre-
paredness of public health care with social services and private health care.
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4 TIIVISTELMÄ
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness. Joint Self-Assesment Report. Helsinki 2007. 53 s. 
(Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriön selvityksiä, ISSN 1236-2115; 2008:2) 
ISBN 978-952-00-2516-8 (PDF)
Euroopan tautiviraston (ECDC), EU komission sekä WHO-Euroopan alueen 
edustajat perehtyivät Suomen influenssapandemia-varautumiseen 12.-15.6.2007. 
Tutustumiskäynnin tavoitteena oli kartoittaa Suomen pandemia-varautumisen 
aste, todeta sen vahvuudet ja kehittämiskohteet sekä tukea kansallisia asiantun-
tijoita työn jatkamiseksi ja jakamiseksi muiden EU-jäsenmaiden kesken. Vastaava 
arviointi on meneillään myös muissa Euroopan maissa. 
Tutustumiskäynnin perusteella ECDCn asiantuntijat ovat yhdessä kansallisten 
asiantuntijoiden kanssa laatineet toimenpidesuosituksia sisältävän raportin ”Joint 
Self-Assessment Report on the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness in Finland, June 
2007”. 
ECDCn raportissa kuvataan Suomen pandemiavarautumisen tilanne kesällä 
2007. Kansallinen varautumissuunnitelma influenssapandemiaa varten valmistui 
loppuvuonna 2006. Sen julkistamisen yhteydessä järjestettiin tiedotus- ja koulu-
tustilaisuuksia kaikissa miljoonapiireissä, joissa oli sairaanhoitopiirien edustus läs-
nä. Sen jälkeen sairaanhoitopiirit ovat laatineet omia varautumissuunnitelmiaan. 
ECDCn raportin päähavaintojen mukaan Suomen suurin haaste on saada valta-
kunnalliset ja alueelliset ohjeet toimiviksi sovellutuksiksi myös kunnallisella tasol-
la.  Tähän ECDC arvelee kuluvan vielä pari vuotta intensiivistä työaikaa. Raportin 
keskeisimmät jatkotoimia edellyttävät ehdotukset koskevat  kansallisen varautu-
missuunnittelun jatkuvuutta ja koordinaatiota sekä alueellisen ja paikallisen tason 
suunnitelmien operationalisuutta. Raportissa korostetaan myös julkisen terveyden-
huollon varautumisen sovittamista yhteen sosiaalihuollon ja yksityisen terveyden-
huollon kanssa. 
Asiasanat
ehdotukset, ohjeet, raportit, sairaanhoito, terveydenhuoltohenkilöstö, terveyden-
huoltojärjestelmä, terveydensuojelu
5 SAMMANDRAG
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness. Joint Self-Assesment Report. Helsingfors 2008. 53 s. 
(Social- och hälsovårdsministeriets rapporter, ISSN 1236-2115; 2008:2)
ISBN 978-952-00-2516-8 (PDF)
Representanterna för den europeiska smittskyddsmyndigheten (ECDC), EU-kom-
missionen och  WHO i Europa bekantade sig med Finlands beredskap för en in-
fluensapandemi 12–15.6.2007. Målet för studiebesöket var att kartlägga Finlands 
grad av pandemiberedskap, fastställa dess styrkor och utvecklingsmål samt stödja 
nationella experter i att fortsätta med och dela arbetet med de övriga medlemslän-
derna i EU. En motsvarande utvärdering pågår även i andra länder i Europa.
På basis av studiebesöket har ECDC:s experter tillsammans med nationella ex-
perter utarbetat rapporten ”Joint Self-Assessment Report on the Influenza Pande-
mic Preparedness in Finland, June 2007” med åtgärdsrekommendationer.
I ECDC:s rapport beskrivs situationen för Finlands pandemiberedskap somma-
ren 2007. En nationell beredskapsplan för en influensapandemi blev färdig mot 
slutet av år 2006. I samband med dess publicering ordnades informations- och ut-
bildningsmöten i samtliga s.k. miljonkretsar där sjukvårdsdistriktens representanter 
var närvarande. Därefter har sjukvårdsdistrikten utarbetat egna beredskapsplaner.
Enligt  de främsta observationerna i ECDC:s rapport är den största utmaningen 
för Finland att se till att de riksomfattande, regionala och lokala anvisningarna blir 
fungerande tillämpningar också på kommunal nivå. ECDC tror att detta ännu krä-
ver ett par år av intensivt arbete. De viktigaste förslagen i rapporten som förutsät-
ter fortsatta åtgärder gäller den nationella beredskapsplanens kontinuitet och ko-
ordination samt planernas operationalitet på både regional och lokal nivå. Rappor-
ten poängterar även förenandet av den offentliga hälso- och sjukvårdens beredskap 
med socialvården och den privata hälso- och sjukvården. 
Nyckelord
förslag, anvisningar, rapporter, hälso- och sjukvård, hälsovårdspersonal, hälsovårds-
system, hälsoskydd
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MAIN FINDINGS:
 Finland has a number of inherent strengths for preparing for a pandemic 
– not least is the involvement of the central Heads of Preparedness group 
with representation from each Ministry; as well as the role of the National 
Emergency Supply Agency in ensuring sufficient stockpiles in such a profes-
sional manner.
 Finland has come a long way in pandemic preparedness in the health sector 
and has advanced very well in involving the other sectors likely to be af-
fected.
 As the basic Healthcare services are the responsibility of 400 Municipalities, 
applying common standards for the whole country will be a big challenge 
over the coming years.
 Finland probably needs about two more years of intensive work to have fully 
implemented the national preparedness plan,.
Country Recommendations
1. A National Pandemic Planning committee should be established with the 
role of ensuring continuity in coordinating pandemic preparedness and to 
ensure the plan becomes operational at all levels - the present arrangement 
of the Heads of Preparedness is not dedicated exclusively to this problem.
2. The present plan contains many issues which still require definite decisions. 
This plan now needs to be made operational at all levels (including at the 
municipal level) and a dedicated National Pandemic Planning Committee is 
probably the right mechanism for this.
3. To ensure long term sustainability, the government should consider intro-
ducing a specific budget line for the pandemic preparedness planning, coor-
dination and implementation.
4. There needs to be closer collaboration with the private sector to ensure 
greater congruence in pandemic preparedness, including with the medical 
private sector for their possible recruitment during pandemic phase 6.
5. There is potential to establish a more solid basis for future joint planning 
between the National Emergency Supply Agency and the pandemic prepar-
edness teams (together with KTL).
6. Further development of the main communication messages for use at vari-
ous levels, especially the local level, and in different scenarios, should ensure 
uniformity and one governmental web portal will be an efficient tool to 
help achieve this.
7. It is unclear how the coordination and crisis management at the Regional 
level will operate in an actual crisis situation: there is a need for a clearer 
command and control structure from the regional to the local level, espe-
cially for phase 6.  The plans need to be tested in simulation exercises.
98. There needs to be stronger guidance and support offered from the Nation-
al level to the local and regional levels to help in the implementation and 
further operationalization of their preparedness plans (especially storage of 
vaccines, distribution, dealing with corpses, massive clinical waste disposal, 
etc). 
9. The plan needs to undergo more simulation exercises to improve it’s imple-
mentation, particularly at the local level.  So far the exercises have mainly 
been held at the national level.  There is the need for more operational exer-
cises especially involving the regional and local level of hospitals and health 
care centres (also possibly some should be planned with neighbouring coun-
tries).
10. A surprisingly small number of technical human resources are available to 
work on pandemic preparedness at all levels, including at the national level. 
These vulnerable structures need strengthening with stable financing to en-
sure sustainability and the surge capacity needed in larger biothreat situ-
ations. Without this, there is a risk that infectious disease surveillance and 
control in other substance areas will deteriorate.
11. The risk perception of the public and professionals is declining, possibly in 
reaction to the declining media attention - this should not be allowed to in-
fluence the commitment of the political stakeholder.  The involvement and 
participation of the media in the planned pandemic exercises could help 
reduce this trend.
12. Regional and local plans should be made available to one another so that 
there can be sharing of each others preparedness and operational strategies. 
Also wider inter-sectoral sharing of the plans, e.g. health with food and trans-
port etc, would be beneficial to all parties.
13. The preparedness plan needs to be updated on a continuous basis, amending 
and adding various specific plans and guidelines and elaborating further and 
in greater detail the role of the social care sector at national, regional  and lo-
cal levels or elaborating guidance to help the local level in dealing with such 
delicate matters as day care and school closures, mass gatherings reduction 
policies, etc.
14. The development of the planned national electronic patient record system 
needs to bear in mind the specific needs and opportunities for surveillance 
in a pandemic, from it’s early planning phases.
15. Although the infectious disease control capacity at many of the Hospital 
Districts has improved, it is important that more administrative and finan-
cial incentives continue to be offered to encourage the remaining hospitals 
with weak or non-existing infectious disease teams to improve their capac-
ity.
16. Some effort needs to be spent in ensuring that the level of material and 
organisational preparedness is sufficient and equal across the different geo-
graphic parts of the country.
17. Various health workforce concerns on the impact of the pandemic, including 
occupational safety, compensation, and absenteeism need to be addressed 
and a common position prepared before the pandemic.
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ECDC Recommendations
1) ECDC should formalise an ‘exchange of information relationship’ with the 
Finnish government so that the country data on the effectiveness and use of 
antivirals and the pre-pandemic vaccine at the national level for dissemina-
tion to the other EU MS.
2) ECDC should consider objective criteria for measuring the level of the 
country’s stage of advanced pandemic planning, possibly by linking to how 
well it could be expected to do in a pandemic.
3) ECDC should enter into discussion with WHO to see how to improve the 
system of grading and describing the pandemic, to continue to improve the 
elaboration of details of the country preparedness plans.
4) ECDC should finalise its ‘menu’ on the effective non-pharmaceutical public 
health measures and distribute these to assist in Finland’s planning activi-
ties.
Purpose of mission – Specific Objectives
1. To support the national authorities in evaluating and improving the status of 
pandemic influenza preparedness in Finland, including the interoperability 
of its plans with other countries in Europe;
2. To determine the current level of influenza preparedness;
3. To identify strengths of pandemic influenza preparedness and areas where 
further work is needed;
4. To identify specific steps for improvement and areas where support from 
the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) / WHO/
EC and other organizations may be needed. 
The end product is an agreed recommended action list for improvement for both 
the country and the ECDC.
Background
Evaluating the readiness of the European Union and its Member States for influ-
enza are integral components of the overall process of improving overall pandemic 
preparedness in Europe.  A starting point for improving pandemic preparedness 
was a workshop on preparedness planning organized jointly by the European Com-
mission (EC) and WHO EURO in Luxembourg, March 2005.  A second workshop 
convened by WHO took place in Copenhagen in October 2005 after the activa-
tion of ECDC (in May 2005) which then became the third partner in the process 
and a third workshop was convened by ECDC in Uppsala, Sweden in May 2006. 
Between May and October 2005 a process for assessing countries’ pandemic pre-
paredness was developed by ECDC with the other two partners. Key to this was 
an assessment tool which then began to be used by Member States and the part-
ners.1  In 2005, country visits were started, conducted by the ECDC/Commis-
1) ECDC Pandemic Influenza – Assessment Tool http://www.ecdc.eu.int/Health_topics/
 Pandemic_Influenza/Assessment_tool.html
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sion/WHO-EURO partnership in a number of EU and non-EU European coun-
tries with a view to completing all European countries by the end of 2007.  The 
assessment tool derives from WHO documents and an EU Communication on 
pandemic planning and has developed steadily based on experience and events.2,3,4 
For example over time the approach has become more of a joint effort between 
an internal and external members of the Assessment team.  Also there has been a 
steadily increasing emphasis on interoperability and non-health sector contribu-
tions and greater emphasis on dealing with seasonal influenza and (since the au-
tumn of 2005) the response to highly pathogenic avian influenza.5
The third European workshop in Uppsala in May 2006 reviewed progress since 
March 2005 and concluded that although major progress had been achieved a 
number of ongoing needs remained including: 
 political commitment for preparedness planning, 
 increased resources (human and financial), 
 more research, 
 the resolution of complex legal and ethical issues, 
 need to develop common solutions and cross-border co-operation 
 (interoperability),
 use of antivirals,
 development of preparedness in the primary care and hospital sectors,
 preparation for avian influenza. 
In 2006, further assessment visits have taken place in Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Latvia and Austria. Visits continued in 
2007 (Ireland, Luxemburg, Malta, Sweden, Netherlands, Cyprus) with a view to 
finalising the remaining countries within the year.  Regional and focused meet-
ings were undertaken partially to help prepare a Status Report6 on pandemic pre-
paredness requested by Commissioner Kyprianou and also to focus on the issues 
of Communications, Interoperability, Use of Antivirals and Hospital Preparedness. 
That report gave many policy options but especially focused on the need to work 
in the coming two to three years in the following five areas 
 Integrated planning across governments. 
 Making plans operational at the local level. 
 Interoperability at the national and regional level.
 Stepping up prevention efforts against seasonal influenza.
 Extending influenza research.
From 12 to 15 June 2007 a six-person group visited Finland to join a local group 
from relevant Government departments to form a joint team to undertake an as-
sessment with these objectives (Annex 2).  
2) WHO Global Influenza Preparedness Plan 2005 
 http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/influenza/GIP_2005_5Eweb.pdf
3) WHO Checklist for Pandemic Preparedness Planning 2005 
 http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/influenza/FluCheck6web.pdf 
4) Assessment tool Version September 2006 http://www.ecdc.eu.int/documents/pdf/
 AssessmentToolPandemicInfluenzaPreparedness_13_9_2006.pdf
5) WHO Responding to the avian influenza pandemic threat: 
 Recommended Strategic Actions  2005 http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/
 influenza/WHO_CDS_CSR_GIP_05_8-EN.pdf
6) European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 
 in the European Union Status Report as of Autumn 2006 ECDC January 2007 
 http://www.ecdc.eu.int/pdf/Pandemic_preparedness.pdf
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Organization of the Visit and Application of the Assessment Tool
Part A of the Assessment Tool was sent in advance to the local team and the infor-
mation from this was analysed prior to the mission.  Several teleconferences were 
held to discuss the main priority areas of focus, the programme and the logistics. 
Once in the country the Assessment Team held meetings with a number of indi-
viduals from a range of institutions over the four days of the visit.  This included 
representatives from other (non-health) Ministries, national technical agencies 
(National Emergency Supply Agency, Evira, KTL, etc), regional and local level 
government and non-government bodies and service bodies (annexes 1 and 3). 
The external team members wish to express their gratitude for the time so gener-
ously provided by the many individuals they met and the care and attention af-
forded them by their Finnish hosts in what was an intensive time for all concerned. 
An impressive number of presentations were made to the team and an excellent 
record of the discussions was kept (see Annex 4).
The conclusions in this report are based to varying degrees on the completed 
Assessment Tool (Annex 5) the presentations and background documentation, 
systematic questions, site visits and less structured discussions held within the lim-
ited time frame available with the persons listed in Annex 2.
General Information
 Organization of the health services
Finland has a population of 5,2 million with 416 municipalities responsible for 
organizing their health and preventive health care measures.  Municipal self-go-
vernment gives these municipalities and their 20 Hospital Districts (run by the 
municipalities) extensive opportunities for deciding on how to organise their own 
health care services, including what is required in a possible pandemic situation. 
These powers are laid down by the Primary Health Care Act (PHCA) and the Act 
on Specialised Medical Care.  In the case of infectious diseases, they are also bound 
by the Communicable Diseases Act (CDA).  The regulations of the Local Govern-
ment Act must also be taken into account.
As part of primary health care (PHC) services, the local municipal level author-
ity is responsible for maintaining health advisory services, organise immunisations, 
organise medical care and emergency outpatient services regardless of the patient’s 
place of residence.  In order to carry out these functions, a municipality, or several 
municipalities jointly, must have a Health Centre (HC) consisting of a number 
of service outlets.  According to recent survey of the Finnish Medical Association 
there were in the beginning of 2007, 3600 medical doctors working in the health 
centres (about 21% of working medical doctors (total 17 200)).  HC may have 
in-patient beds.  The municipality can also purchase the services from the private 
sector, although the private health sector cannot be obligued to offer services in a 
crisis situation.  The mean density of medical doctors is 310 inhabitants per MD, 
but there has been lack of physicians in HCs in the more remote areas.  
Secondary (specialized) health care is provided by a particular Hospital District, 
each of which contains a central and some also a regional hospital providing care for 
the population in its area.  Of the 20 central hospitals, five are university hospitals, 
which also provide tertiary levels of treatment.  
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (MSAH, STM) is made up of two 
ministers and both have a small number of politically appointed staff.  The MSAH 
sector has the biggest overall budget of the Finnish Ministries (overall annual es-
timate of health:  Euros 8 billion).  The MSAH prepares legislation in the area of 
social welfare and health care and steers and supervises its implementation.  The 
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Ministry prepares a Target and Action Plan for Social Welfare and Health Care for 
each four-year legislative period for approval by the government.  The social wel-
fare and health care sector contains eight agencies and institutions (the institutes 
work with great independence) which in cooperation with the MSAH take care of 
a range of research, development, statistical and supervising functions.  On natio-
nal level, the general planning, management and monitoring of protection against 
infectious diseases is the remit of the MSAH, which is responsible for the prepa-
redness of social and healthcare services for an influenza pandemic.  MSAH re-
cruits the support of the National Public Health Institute (KTL), which alongside 
MSAH maintains contact with international organisations.  The KTL also provides 
expert guidance to regional and local authorities and the public.
Under healthcare legislation, MSAH, the National Authority for Medicolegal 
Affairs (NAMA) and the 6 State Provincial Offices (SPO) are responsible for di-
recting, planning and supervision of the municipal health care.  The health system 
is led by means of “guidance through information” rather than a top-down com-
mand and control structure.  The latter could be introduced in such cases as during 
a pandemic, when marked societal disruption would be expected to take place and 
then require the Emergency Powers Act to be used.  MSAH, NAMA and SPOs are 
also regulating the quality and legality of health care, public and private.
 Particular Strengths of the Country
 The historically strong collaboration between the human and animal health 
sector on all levels has led to a great deal of good work carried out with the 
veterinary sector;
 The plans have been very good at defining the roles of all players, although 
the interoperability not yet been fully tested;
 A large amount of good technical materials, processes and procedures has 
been prepared;
 Many of the delicate ethical issues have been well thought out and re-
solved;
 The Heads of Preparedness meetings in the PM office is a good example of 
ensuring the right level of inter-sectoral collaboration.  This collaboration is 
just as excellent at the lower levels, maintained by interministerial coordi-
nation groups at the provincial and municipality levels.
 There appears to be a good level of pandemic preparedness at the university 
hospital level, where the plans have been developed to a highly operational 
level and the level of involvement of their Communicable Diseases de-
partments in the epidemiological investigations on the field has been very 
good. 
 The legislation on obligatory stockpiling of frequently used medicines and 
basic medical supply is a very positive element;
 The plans for 25% antiviral stockpiling should ensure that most curative 
treatment needs are covered, however this will not be sufficient for any 
prophylaxis;
 There is a high technical quality of knowledge and understanding of the 
main issues and difficulties related to pandemic preparedness;
 The planned national electronic patient record system should form a very 
strong basis for surveillance in a pandemic.
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 The intensive media public awareness campaign to improve this year’s sea-
sonal vaccination uptake is welcomed. 
 The additional training in epidemiology and public health for the regional 
level is an important activity, with positive implications also for the control 
of other CDs;
 The infectious disease capacity at the Hospital District has benefited greatly 
from the direct economic support and guidance from the centre.
 The National Emergency Supply Agency is a very suitable and flexible tool 
for special purchases outside the normal state budget and is a real asset for 
pandemic preparedness.  
 The level of cooperation with the relevant international organisations such 
as ECDC, WHO, EC, etc, is very good and should continue to be strength-
ened for the benefit of all parties, in particular to enhance the interoperabil-
ity of Finnish plans with neighbouring countries.
 The ’Prepandemic’ vaccine ordered for the whole population and the ad-
vance purchase agreement on pandemic vaccine for the whole population 
are important achievements.
15
 SEASONAL INFLUENZA
1.  Seasonal influenza surveillance   
Description
All the laboratories carrying out influenza diagnostics notify their positive findings 
to the National Infectious Diseases Registry (NIDR) maintained by KTL, resulting 
in approximately 1,000-3,000 influenza diagnoses confirmed by laboratories an-
nually.  
Finland has had surveillance for respiratory infections and influenza for a long 
time in selected population groups, such as army conscripts.  The KTL is develop-
ing a better surveillance system in cooperation with health centres, which will 
automatically extract information from the patient record databases and pass on 
to the KTL data on visits caused by respiratory infections. 
Comment
Syndromic surveillance for respiratory diseases is recognised as a useful tool for 
both seasonal and for pandemic influenza and the plans for starting a sentinel sys-
tem this year are welcomed.  The planned system to ensure automated extraction 
from routine patient records using algorithms to flag up specific problems should 
be an effective method also for monitoring in an epidemic.  The web-based no-
tification system into the NIDR database and the centralised electronic patient 
records are also important elements that should contribute towards a good no-
tification system for influenza surveillance.  However these systems do rely on 
the routine systems to remain functioning normally, which may not always be the 
case, especially for the primary care sector, during the peak periods of an influenza 
season.
Recommendations
 Explore ways of making the primary care surveillance more robust so that it 
would be more sustainable in a severe epidemic/pandemic.
 Seasonal influenza surveillance system: as yet there is no solid data collec-
tion system (only in special arrangements (sentinel sites like garrisons, some 
health care centres) – this needs development.
2.  Seasonal influenza vaccination programmes
Description
Finland has provided free influenza vaccination for several years to specific risk 
groups.  In 2002 the recommendations for seasonal influenza vaccination was 
extended to all those aged 65 years or older.  The vaccine coverage in the risk 
groups is assessed each year by a questionnaire survey to influenza vaccination 
contact persons in the primary health care centres.  The consumption of influ-
enza vaccine doses in the whole population is based on statistics collected by 
the Finnish Pharmaceutical Data Ltd and is based on the sales figures.  The do-
ses used in 2006 for the risk groups and the private market together were ap-
proximately 753 000.  The vaccination coverage for those included in the national 
recommendation has been in 2002: 43%, 2003: 45%, 2004: 46%, 2005: 52% and 
2006: 46%.  For the year 2007, the KTL has planned a large scale communica-
tion campaign to help increase the vaccination coverage.  For that part of the 
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campaign focusing on the risk groups, a special website has been set up which 
contains a variety of promotional materials (poster, leaflet and letter of invita-
tion to vaccination) and also ideas for activities by the primary health care cen-
tres responsible for the vaccination programme.  In addition, articles about the 
importance of influenza vaccinations in the risk groups have been published an-
nually in professional journals.  The first national campaign targeting directly 
the elderly and parents to children 6 – 35 months of age is starting in the au-
tumn 2007.  The campaign includes information through TV, radio and website. 
Comment
The seasonal vaccination programme is coordinated well by the KTL, who is also 
responsible for purchasing the vaccines.  The present uptake of the seasonal influ-
enza is lower than expected considering the strong tradition of public health in 
this country.  One reason for this could be because the seasonal vaccination pro-
gramme is implemented by the municipal health care centres, there is quite a high 
degree of variability in their perception of the importance of this activity.
It is important that this vaccine is given greater priority to enable the seasonal 
influenza vaccination programme to achieve (or exceed) the WHO target of 75% 
by 2010.  The true accuracy of the data on vaccine coverage appears to be doubt-
ful and the plans to improve the routine system of data entry of the vaccinated 
patients needs to be supported as a priority.
Recommendations
 The plans for the enhanced campaign this autumn aiming to increase the 
uptake of the seasonal vaccine, are welcomed.  One audience that will need 
particular targeting to increase their awareness, apart from the general pub-
lic, should be the health care workers, as many of these do not appear to 
perceive influenza vaccination as a priority.
 The method of recording the vaccine coverage needs to be strengthened, as 
this will also be of benefit in the event of a pandemic.  One eventual aim 
should be to collect routine data on vaccine uptake in both the target high 
risk groups as well as in the heath care workers.  This can be collected rou-
tinely based on ‘returns’ (numbers of persons vaccinated verses those not 
vaccinated) in order to monitor uptake by provider and detect under-per-
formance.
3.  Seasonal influenza laboratory capacity 
Description
The KTL Influenza Centre (NIC) examines the specimens for epidemiological 
purposes using viral culture methods. The laboratory isolates influenza virus from 
patient specimens, defines their type and subtype, analyzes their antigenic and ge-
netic properties, and monitors mutation of the influenza viruses during the influ-
enza season and between epidemics. 
The number of specimens that can be handled per day at the NIC laboratory is 
about 40 in regular circumstances. The number of qualified staff in NIC is four: 
1 PhD, 1 MSc, 2 technicians. There are good specimen transport arrangements in 
place for getting specimens to the national centre. So far there is no explicit plan 
for NIC surge capacity.  The time from receipt of specimens to having the confir-
mation of a WHO novel type (H5N1) is a maximum of 48 hours.
The NIC plans to merge with the Respiratory Virus Reference Laboratory at 
KTL during Fall 2007. This will double the number of technical staff. The Re-
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spiratory Virus Reference Laboratory currently is responsible for all the PCR di-
agnostics, including detection of unusual influenza virus subtypes, and currently 
serves as EISS reference laboratory.
Five virus laboratories in the university hospitals in Helsinki, Kuopio, Oulu, 
Tampere, and Turku use  immunofluorescence staining of exfoliated, respiratory 
epithelial cells, immunoassays, rapid culture, and in some instances also PCR for in-
fluenza diagnosis. In addition, hospital laboratories as well as laboratories of public 
and private health care centers use point-of-care tests to identify influenza viruses 
and RSV in certain patients. Virus-positive results are reported to the NIDR. 
Comment
The five main laboratories involved in virological surveillance, all in association 
with the university hospitals, appear to be adequately prepared for virus isolation, 
PCR or RSV  (Rapid Shell Vial Culture?).  The provisions for typing and subtyping 
(done centrally) also appear to be very good.  There needs to be some clarification 
of plans specifying at what stage of the pandemic the central reference lab will 
stop accepting routine sample requests for sub-typing and turn only to occasional 
anti-viral resistance cultures and some sentinel typing.  This ‘triaging’ of samples 
may be necessary in a large seasonal epidemic as well as during a pandemic.  Also 
it is not entirely clear how the virology lab data will link in with the epidemiology 
data during a peak seasonal epidemic, and especially so during a pandemic.  
Recommendation 
 It was not clear whether the stockpiles of essential laboratory reagents and 
disposables are adequate – these should be estimated carefully and the 
stockpiling of a suitable stock of reagents clarified in the plan.
 The breakpoint for changing the testing strategies during a peak epidemic or 
pandemic should be formally defined and agreed. These could take the form 
of clinical algorithms. 
 These plans for stockpiling the reagents, as well as the clinical algorithms for 
triaging samples in a seasonal epidemic/pandemic should be tested in one of 
the forthcoming national pandemic exercises planned.  
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 PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
4.  Planning and Coordination 
Description
  Political awareness
According to the Government policy decision of 27 November 2003, Strategy For 
Securing The Functions Vital To Society, one of the four focal areas in the next few 
years in terms of improving performance is health protection, including unexpect-
ed serious epidemics.  The Government is drafting proposals for Parliament for 
further amendments to current legislation to support this strategy.  The Govern-
ment including the Prime Minister is committed to organise exercises on both 
avian influenza and pandemic influenza preparedness.
  Legal and ethical framework
The powers and obligations stipulated in the Communicable Diseases Act, CDA 
(583/1986) are central to combating an influenza pandemic, and they form an 
adequate basis for governance.  The obligations stipulated in this law cover all ad-
ministrative levels of public healthcare: the MSAH, KTL, SPOs, HDs and local 
municipal authorities.  This law obligates the authorities to take urgent action, if 
the population is in danger of being exposed to a spreading dangerous communi-
cable disease.  The decisions of the authorities must be executed immediately, re-
gardless of submission or appeal.  Revisions have been made in the CDA to make 
it fully compatible with International Health Regulations (IHR), which has been 
accepted as law in Finland.
When prompt action is required in order to prevent the spread of a communica-
ble disease posing a serious threat to public health, the MSAH and, on provincial 
level the SPO, are empowered to make the necessary decisions.  These decisions 
include the compulsory implementation, within a fixed time period, of any meas-
ures that may be applicable in cases of infectious diseases involving serious danger 
to the public.
The local authority is obliged to organise the work of infectious disease preven-
tion in its area, as part of their primary/public health care services.  Under the 
PHCA, implementation of primary health care is organised by an organ set up by 
the municipality, with multiple membership.  In the CDA, this is called the mu-
nicipal body responsible for the prevention of communicable diseases.  The practi-
cal work is organized through the Health Center.
Ethical issues in national influenza pandemic planning have been extensively 
discussed in several multidisciplinary ethical groups, including the main National 
Advisory Board on Health Care Ethics (NABHCE).
  National pandemic planning committee (working group)
On April 2005, the MSAH nominated a National Working Group for Pandemic 
Preparedness, with the following duties: (1) to prepare a national plan for pan-
demic preparedness; (2) to establish guidelines for preparedness in the health care 
services; (3) to ensure efficient cooperation between different administrative sec-
tors.  This Working Group consists of representatives of the MSAH administrative 
sectors, from the KTL, the National Agency for Medicines (NAM), SPOs, HDs, 
PHC, the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities (AFLRA), and 
civic organizations, as well as the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF), the 
Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of De-
fence.  This working group was an ad hoc group and it finished its work at the 
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time when the proposal for a National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness plan was 
produced in March 2006.
Government Meeting of the Heads of Preparedness (GMHP), consisting of a 
high level official in each Ministry, is the permanent coordinating group function-
ing at the national level.  The group functions under the group of the Meeting 
of the Ministries´ Permanent Secretaries (MMPS).  GMHP has the coordination 
duty of all preparedness issues in its responsibility.
At MSAH the main permanent body involved is the National Advisory Body on 
Communicable Diseases, with the task to advise the MSAH on all communicable 
disease issues.  Another permanent body at the MSAH is the Advisory Board for 
Health and Welfare in Emergency Conditions, which also deals with some aspects 
of pandemic preparedness.  MSAH does not at present have a specific permanent 
committee on pandemic  planning.
  National influenza pandemic preparedness plan
The ad hoc national pandemic planning committee reported to Liisa Hyssälä, Min-
ister of Health and Social Services, on 15 March 2006.  After circulation of the 
proposal for comments (altogether by 50 organizations), the plan has been updat-
ed and adopted at the MSAH.  The final version was also approved by the GMHP. 
In addition to the National Working Group for Pandemic Preparedness, several 
other ministries and government bodies have implemented measures to improve 
their pandemic preparedness.  The plan is published in Finnish, Swedish and Eng-
lish on the web address www.stm.fi. 
The responsibility for the basic operative management of a pandemic situation 
lies with the health authorities – mainly of the MSAH, in cooperation with So-
cial and Health Departments of SPO.  Operative management involves the direc-
tion of the service system operations, securing of resources and their appropriate 
management, obtaining special powers and expert services as may be required by 
the situation, as well as ensuring adequate cooperation with the authorities.  The 
expert services required for operative management are obtained by the Ministry 
from KTL and other expert bodies.  The pandemic committee at the KTL assesses 
the situation and advises decision-makers. 
The establishment of a command and control centre within the Ministry will 
not affect the responsibilities of the administrative sector, nor its power relations. 
The decisions are made in accordance with the Ministry procedure and other stat-
utory powers.  The control centre will participate in drafting, presentation and 
implementation of decisions.  A pandemic situation may require redistribution of 
resources within an administrative sector. 
Summary diagrams can be found in the National Preparation plan pp. 53 and 49 
and a simplified model in appendix 2. 
The pandemic coordination group (PCG) or committee is foreseen in the 
national plan, but has not yet been established in the current phase 3 situation. 
Whenever considered necessary, the MSAH may appoint a PCG.  Its remit is to 
reinforce the delivery of social and health services and to deal with anything requi-
ring urgent or multi-sectoral measures, including the preparation and coordination 
of issues which do not fall under the remit of the GMHP or the MMPS.  Such me-
asures may be e.g. public communications, required amendments to regulations, 
restricting mobility of the population (e.g. quarantine arrangements), prioritisation 
of medical preventive measures (possibly limiting availability), stockpiling, reserve 
stocks, controlled release of reserve stocks, and rationing of other materials and 
equipment.  The responsibilities of the Coordination Group also include obtaining 
international expertise and experience to support national decision-making.  The 
PCG is chaired by a representative from the MSAH.  Members are appointed 
from various organisations, including: Prime Minister’s Office, MSAH, KTL, NAM, 
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Finnish Institute for Occupational Health (FIOH), NABHCE, SPOs, Hospital Di-
stricts, health centres, AFLRA, and representatives from the relevant ministries. 
Comment
Political awareness:  At the state level, political awareness is high, resulting in an 
adequate level of funding to cover the essential activities related to pandemic pre-
paredness.  The Heads of Preparedness are considered to be an appropriate level 
of authority to deal with the coordination of the response to a pandemic.  As they 
manage a threat model which includes 61 scenarios, only one of which is pandem-
ic influenza, this means that this issue may have to compete against many others 
for their full attention.  
The Heads of Preparedness officially confirmed the pandemic preparedness plan 
in November 2006 and have shown good commitment by meeting regularly to dis-
cuss updates, and prepare for the permanent secretaries’ meetings on the subject. 
This mechanism is a very good example of a high level, cross-sectoral approach, 
focusing on pandemic preparedness with all ministries involved.  It is, however, of 
concern that knowledge about pandemic preparedness plans across other sectors 
seems to be lower than desired.  Thus, while it is positively noted that almost all 
sectors do have a preparedness plan for a pandemic, these sectors should do more 
to share their plans or obtain information about other plans across sectors. 
The National Emergency Supply Agency is another important key national 
stakeholder, responsible for financing and coordinating the security of supplies that 
may be required in any emergencies.  It has clearly been instrumental in promoting 
contingency planning for both the public and private sectors as well as organising 
the general stockpiling, including of pharmaceuticals and medical substances.
On the provincial and municipal level there appears to be a good level of aware-
ness of pandemic preparedness but perhaps the scope and magnitude of the prob-
lems related to, and caused by, a pandemic may not be fully recognized.  This is 
also reflected in the small number of people dedicated to pandemic preparedness 
at sub-national level.
Furthermore, it was observed during the assessment visit that there is a ten-
dency of declining awareness at all levels, probably in response to declining media 
interest and attention on avian and pandemic influenza.  This is a phenomenon 
which is apparent throughout Europe.  It is of particular concern when this hap-
pens at state level, as it is expected that at this level it should be feasible to main-
tain the focus on pandemic preparedness even in times where the risk is generally 
perceived as low.  A welcome initiative to help combat this trend would be the 
planned pandemic phase 6 simulation exercise in Finland in 2008. 
Legal and ethical framework: The central state administration does not appear 
to have a specific legal mandate to become involved in the management of affairs 
at the regional level, even in the event of a pandemic.  Despite this, it was the per-
ception of the assessment team that in fact there is a broad legal framework for 
handling outbreaks of communicable disease from the center and therefore this 
could also be applied to pandemic preparedness and response.  
The law ensuring obligatory stockpiling of frequently used medicines and basic 
medical supplies at the local and regional level is a very positive asset to the pan-
demic preparedness. 
National pandemic planning committee: There is no specific national pandemic 
planning committee in Finland (i.e. a committee whose sole reasonability is to 
work on preparing for the pandemic) but rather, pandemic preparedness issues 
are addressed in the meetings of the Heads of Preparedness referred to above.  A 
surprisingly small number of technical persons are dedicated to work on pandemic 
preparedness at practically all levels, including at the central level. 
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National influenza pandemic preparedness plan: The current version of the na-
tional pandemic preparedness plan is robust and addresses a broad range of rel-
evant topics.  A positive feature of this plan is that it draws upon the lessons learnt 
from the previous exercises of pandemic phases 3-5.  The plan should be further 
strengthened when a simulation exercise of pandemic phase 6 is conducted in 
2008, leading to a revision and refinement of the plan in its current form. 
There are still several of the items mentioned in the Finnish pandemic prepar-
edness plan that have still not been implemented.  Also there are some elements 
that may be limited in their level of operability.  One of these issues that the na-
tional authorities should address is how the regions will actually work together in 
a pandemic.  National exercises will probably help to clarify this, although there 
are some models from other countries that might be adopted, but a solution would 
need to be devised that best suits Finland.
Recommendations
 Political awareness: A dedicated pandemic preparedness committee would 
help ensure that a group of people are fully committed and dedicated to 
pandemic preparedness and thus not occupied for most of their time with 
other issues.  In addition, such a committee would help ensure that the na-
tional pandemic preparedness plan is implemented at all levels of society. 
Such a pandemic committee could also work more to improve the awareness 
of pandemic preparedness at sub-national level, including initiating more 
thorough planning at municipal level, which is strongly recommended.  
 In addition, it is recommended that a specific permanent budget line for 
pandemic preparedness is established in order to secure long-term commit-
ment and sustained upgrading of pandemic preparedness in Finland.
 To improve the general level of awareness it is recommended that repre-
sentatives of the media are invited to participate in the 2008 simulation 
exercise, as this is an excellent opportunity to increase their focus on this 
issue in the country.  As general media interest in avian influenza declines, 
attention should focus on how the present good relationships between the 
Ministries can be maintained in the longer term.  
 National pandemic planning committee: The assessment team recommends 
the establishment of a permanent committee with pandemic preparedness 
as their sole focus.  While the Heads of Preparedness committee and the 
people involved in pandemic preparedness at the MoH and the KTL have 
clearly come a long way with preparations for a pandemic, it is feared that 
this ‘part-time’ system (shared with all the other potential crisis) may be too 
vulnerable or is not sufficiently robust (with regards to human resources) 
either for sustaining the desired level of further planning needed or for the 
implementation of preparedness, nor for coordination of all the activities 
during a pandemic. 
 National influenza pandemic preparedness plan: The version presented is a 
good plan that needs to be implemented at all levels, in an operational and 
practical manner.  Several important decisions still need to be taken on a 
number of issues and these then need to be written into the plan as part of 
the on-going process of updating. 
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5.   Situation Monitoring and Assessment, Pandemic Surveillance
Description
  Situation Monitoring and Assessment
In a pandemic the MSAH will set up a national command centre to support its 
operative management activities, situation monitoring and assessment, as the situ-
ation requires.  The MSAH command centre is in continuous contact with the So-
cial and Health Departments of SPOs and the KTL, the NRID and the European 
Union Early Warning Response System (EWRS) of infectious diseases together 
with other EU and international authorities.
MSAH, assisted by this national control centre, continuously assesses the situa-
tion based on the epidemiological surveillance information, antiviral consumption 
monitoring and the reports of the SPOs, which will supply the control centre with 
a clear picture of the situation in the social and healthcare services, resources and 
pandemic situation in their own areas.
The national assessment of the social and healthcare services situation is de-
livered to the situation assessment system of Prime Minister’s Office.  It will also 
receive situation monitoring information from other sectors as well. 
  Pandemic surveillance
The NIDR is expanding its applications to include a web-based simple notification 
system for influenza cases, in the event of a pandemic developing, which is antici-
pated to be functional by Mid-2008.  Until then the robust telefax based notifica-
tion system would be used in case of a pandemic.
KTL is developing another new surveillance system with the main software pro-
viders for PHC patient data systems, an automated surveillance system which will 
extract patient visit data and send them automatically to a central data base every 
24 hours. This sentinel surveillance will be coordinated with the virological sur-
veillance system. The development of this project, however is currently stagnated 
due to shortage of expert personnel at the KTL. 
A law has been passed for a comprehensive national data holding system which 
will have continuous updated patient visit data, expected to be fully operation 
within 4-6 years.  Developments are being explored on how to extract data re-
levant for syndromic surveillance from this holding system in a timely manner. 
Procedures are in place for the timely identification of individual suspected cases 
in pandemic threat phases 3-5 (WHO).
Comment
In a severe pandemic the operating conditions for surveillance and what is required 
from surveillance systems can be very different from the situation in ‘peace-time’. 
Equally, daily monitoring becomes more important.  The surveillance system as 
planned by the KTL should work well for the inter-pandemic and pre-pandemic 
phases (Phases up to Phase 4-5), however it is less certain whether it will be robust 
enough for the demands of Phase 6.  This is because the proposed system of auto-
mated extraction from the routine records system relies on the presumption that 
some sort of routine electronic patient record keeping will be maintained through-
out, which may not be the case in all areas during the peak stress periods.  The 
other plans, to centralise all patient electronic records, should also allow the possi-
bility of extracting data for other purposes such as syndromic surveillance, and this 
is another positive element.  The web-based notification system as planned should 
be robust enough even for use in a pandemic – but again there may possibly be 
doctors in some areas who will be unable to find the time to do even this simple 
task in the peak of Phase 6 – this needs to be borne in mind. 
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The plans for the virological surveillance to be carried out by the five regional 
labs, in association with the university hospitals (with typing and sub-typing done 
in the central reference laboratory , see below) are all perfectly logical. 
Recommendations
 There needs to be some thought given to planning a simplified ‘secondary’ 
system of surveillance in the peak of the pandemic – in case the planned 
systems, mainly based on electronic reporting, break down.
6.   National reference laboratory for influenza / 
 National influenza centre (NIC)
Description 
The National Influenza Center (NIC) is part of the Department of Viral Diseases 
and Immunology at KTL. Currently there are 8 staff members, 3 with an academic 
education and 5 technical support staff. In addition, 2 graduate students are paid 
through extramural funding. The NIC serves as a reference laboratory for both the 
WHO and for EISS. The NIC has facilities for virus culture, typing, sub-typing, and 
antigenic characterization of influenza virus isolates. A separate laboratory for large-
scale culture of influenza viruses is available. Also, the NIC has separate rooms for 
the different steps in molecular detection of influenza viruses. (PCR). These facili-
ties are shared with other units within the Department. By the end of the year 2007, 
a biosafety-level 3 laboratory will be available adjacent to the NIC. The NIC receives 
clinical specimens through a sentinel network of health-care centers. Specimens 
are tested by virus culture in MDCK cells and by PCR. Influenza virus isolates are 
typed, subtyped, and antigenically characterized by hemagglutination inhibition test. 
The nucleotide sequence of hemagglutinin and neuraminidase genes from selected 
viruses is determined and the phylogenetic relationship of viruses isolated through 
consecutive influenza season is analyzed. In addition to influenza viruses, adeno-, 
parainfluenza-, respiratory syncytial-, and human metapneumoviruses are detected 
by PCR. Human bocavirus PCR is performed on selected specimens. 
Comment
Virological surveillance will be carried out by the five regional labs, in association 
with the university hospitals, while the typing and sub-typing is done in the cen-
tral reference laboratory.  The central staffing appears to be just adequate under 
normal circumstances but can be expected to come under considerable strain in 
a pandemic, partly because they would commendably strive to keep up process-
ing the flow of samples for rapid characterisation of circulating strains, match/
mismatch between circulating- and vaccine-strains, drift variants, new strains and 
antiviral resistance.  Therefore the decision to merge the two main reference labs 
is sound and should help increase the staffing capacity in a pandemic.  Still, the 
viral laboratory plans are not very clear about at what stage the central reference 
lab will stop accepting routine samples’ requests for sub-typing and switch only 
to occasional anti-viral resistance cultures or some sentinel typing only.  Also it is 
unclear whether the plans for laboratory reagents and disposable stockpiling are 
adequate for the excess load in a pandemic.
Recommendation
 The emergency plans for the engagement of personnel from research staff or 
other laboratories to improve the lab’s response capability or to replace sick 
technical staff in a pandemic should be more formalised.  
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 Support from the other laboratories at the regional level needs to be better 
planned as it will probably be required.  Routine primary virus detection 
and identification capabilities should be further developed at various other 
regional  institutions to enable them to partly take over this workload of 
pandemic diagnostics, shifting it from the centre, and allowing the centre 
to focus more on the better characterization of emerging threats (new or 
changing viruses) and contributing to policy development.    
 Given the strategic importance of national virological capacity, more atten-
tion needs to be paid to succession planning and the long-term support for 
training of a virology cadre.
 The viral laboratories should have clearer protocols detailing how best to deal 
with times of excess load and when to introduce selective sample testing.
 The viral laboratories should ensure that they have adequate stockpiles of 
reagents and essential disposable equipment for use in the Phase 6 of a pan-
demic.
7.   Outbreak investigation capacity, general and during a pandemic
Description
Outbreak investigation capacity for influenza is limited to relatively small inci-
dents, such as individual cases of imported suspected pandemic influenza, or small 
clusters.  Larger or multiple clusters or outbreaks, or the actual beginning of a pan-
demic would probably overwhelm the capacity.
The organisational model for investigating an outbreak under normal conditions 
is shown in appendix 3.  The same operational mode could be used in suspected 
influenza cases or clusters in pandemic threat phases 3-5.  The general outbreak 
investigation and control model and its capacity have been tested several times per 
year in the investigation of food and waterborne epidemics, and found to function 
appropriately. 
KTL has  a very close collaboration with Hospital District infectious diseases 
teams and is conscious of their needs for more field or interventional epidemiol-
ogy training. 
KTL is starting a limited national field epidemiology training program during 
late 2007, which is partially funded by the new preparedness funds.  It will focus 
initially on University Hospital District teams, and will gradually expand this train-
ing.  The objective is that each Hospital District will have 1-2 infectious disease 
specialists with recent infectious diseases control training. 
The Center of  Biothreats, consisting of laboratory staff from the Finnish De-
fence Forces and minimum allocated laboratory staff from KTL working in KTL 
premises, may increase in staff number, but there is no projected field epidemiol-
ogy or infectious disease control training for this group.
Comment
The regional and local authorities recognize that most of the epidemiology capac-
ity is centralized at the national level, while there is limited capacity on the region-
al and municipal level.  The epidemiologists at KTL are ready to provide support 
in the field at any time (and have done so regularly in the past), but in case of a 
pandemic these resources will be exhausted quite quickly. 
In terms of protective equipment for the outbreak investigation teams, the plans 
to see that these are provided through the obligatory stock at regional and munici-
pal level appear to be adequate.
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Recommendation
 Strong support should be given to the planned short training sessions in field 
epidemiology (6 persons over 2 years from the regional level, who will be 
trained during 4 months at KTL), in order to strengthen the epidemiological 
capacity at both regional and municipal level. 
 It could be envisaged to broaden this sort of training to include even more 
professionals. Consideration should be given to maintaining national train-
ing of regional HD staff through a field epidemiology training programme 
that could then undertake nationally-directed investigations during a pan-
demic.  The same training would also serve to strengthen national , re-
gional and local capacity to protect the health of the public against other 
threats. 
8.   National Public Health Response 
 - Non-Pharmacological Public Health Measures 
Description
In pandemic phases 3-5, the number of cases is small.  The objective of the actions 
at this phase is to prevent a pandemic altogether or to significantly delay the tim-
ing of its onset.  Once the pandemic has begun (phase 6), the aim is to delay the 
timing of the pandemic peak, minimisation of adverse effects to the health of the 
population, and securing of vital functions.  During a pandemic, case numbers can 
be expected to be very high and the infection risk for the whole population is so 
great that certain preventive measures used in phases 3-5 are no longer feasible, 
due to limited resources.  Some methods used in phases 3-5 would no longer have 
any effect on the progress of the pandemic at phase 6.
There are a number of recommended preventive measures, not based on using 
vaccines or drugs, listed in appendix 3 of the national pandemic plan.  These pre-
ventive measures may be used in a pandemic alert situation or during the actual 
pandemic, although in the knowledge that there is little definitive scientific evi-
dence on their effectiveness. 
For travel-related measures no restrictions in international travel have been 
planned, only recommendations to avoid non-essential travel.  Information should 
be given to the population not to travel when ill.  It is possible that some members 
of the neighbouring country populations might travel to Helsinki seeking to obtain 
antivirals during the pandemic.  Still, no attempts of screening on borders or no 
similar restrictions in domestic travel has been planned.
For reduction of transmission of infection from person to person, advice about 
personal behaviour will be provided.  Suitable hand and coughing hygiene should 
be indicated.  Routine wearing of masks are not being recommended.  The prac-
tice of hand shaking should be stopped during the pandemic.  Surface contamina-
tion by respiratory effluents should be avoided.  Advice on cleaning practices and 
information about suitable antiseptic agents should be made available on the in-
ternet for everybody.  Congregating at public meeting places, where close contacts 
are possible, should be avoided e.g. mass gatherings, swimming halls, unnecessary 
visits and public transport vehicles and possibly even restrict children playing to-
gether.  Other public places, such as schools, day care, movies, theatres, etc  should 
be closed.  There should also be plans for reducing army garrison crowding and 
re-deployment.  In the event that they are needed for other essential work, they 
should receive specific education and training.  For reducing social interaction, an-
other recommendation is to introduce distance work by as many workers as pos-
sible, and these should trained so that they could start this as early as possible in 
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the pandemic.  The equipment and systems for this distance working should be 
developed beforehand, during the pandemic planning.
People should learn to recognize the first symptoms when falling ill and they 
should be guided straight to the "final point of treatment".  The population should 
understand the objectives for the correct use of antivirals.  Patient isolation at home 
or in health care facilities needs to be planned on all levels, including both families 
and persons living alone.  Everybody should have their own individual pandemic 
plan.  In the individual family plans and neighbourhood plans, there should be 
considerations for food and work-travelling support to each others.
Comment
Several good ‘non-pharmaceutical prevention measures’ are referred to in the plan, 
these include: advice to avoid non-essential travel, not travelling if ill, the decision 
that there will be no border screening; personal protective measures – such as pro-
moting hand washing with the general public  and simple measure like covering 
the mouth in coughing (no kissing, including the use of alcohol based rubs in the 
home), possibly the general use of masks especially by those ill, recommending 
that no one who feels ill goes into work (encouraging home/distance working) 
and to reduce daily contact within the family.  These appear to be reasonable and 
adequate.  The plan still needs to clarify the decision processes regarding the pro-
hibition of mass gatherings, including public leisure services, triggers to possibly 
break-up army conscripts and send them home for the duration of the pandemic, 
triggers to close schools and day care centres (even though this may adversely 
affect a significant proportion of the work force, including health carers - more 
than half of the employees in the municipal sector work in social services and 
health care - by causing them to stay at home) – this latter step is a major cause 
of concern that needs further thought.  Other planned activities to help improve 
individual behaviour (e.g. early recognition of the disease by the person falling ill 
and then providing clear patient guidance leading them straight to the final point 
of treatment) are relatively clear. 
The KTL itself seldom carries out campaigns directly to the general public but 
it is felt that in this case a health education campaign should be carried out, prob-
ably together with food safety authorities.  The main stakeholders behind a broad 
hand hygiene campaign targeted at the general public are still unclear although 
most large companies could be involved.
Recommendation
 The EU Health Security committee,  drawing from the scientific background 
work of the ECDC needs to consider and discuss in greater detail all the 
non-pharmaceutical measures to clarify exactly when to introduce each of 
these in a pandemic 
 There needs to be an attempt to create national guidelines for the deci-
sion-maker’s consideration on closure of schools and day care centres, to 
help ensure that the municipalities all follow the same criteria and to avoid 
inconsistencies. 
 The KTL, together with other stakeholders such as food safety authorities, 
needs to plan and carry out education campaigns directly to the general 
public on a regular basis, which should be planned to benefit not only by 
improving  public behaviour in a pandemic but also other public health is-
sues.  
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9.  Simulation Exercises 
Description
Finland participated in the "Common Ground" exercise in November 2005, with 
all Ministries and KTL participated, including the Prime Minister´s Office.  In ad-
dition two extensive preparedness exercises have been held in 2005 to test pre-
paredness on national level in a pandemic situation.  In the first "Valha 2005", the 
state and SPO level authorities were also involved.
An avian influenza preparedness exercise testing the functioning of the manage-
ment system was held in March 2006, and a Ministry-level influenza pandemic 
exercise was held in April 2006. 
When the updating of the provincial level plans has been completed, the ef-
fectiveness of their operation should be tested through an exercise specifically de-
signed for assessing the Provincial Offices and regional level administrative sectors. 
This is expected to take place early 2008. 
In human health sector : Two national multisectoral exercises, including the 
southern province, have so far been conducted, with simulations on an avian flu 
outbreak (March 09 – 2006) and then on a cluster of human cases in phases 4 and 
5  (April 28 – 2006), using the first version of the national pandemic influenza 
plan.  A new exercise on phase 6, supported by the December 2006 version of 
the plan, will be organized in spring 2008 by Finnish government.  This exercise 
should seek to ensure that there is adequate multisectoral involvement and that 
the communications aspects are fully involved, to better clarify their roles.
In animal health sector : An exercise on Newcastle disease has been conducted 
in 2004.  Since then, several exercises on avian influenza outbreak simulations 
have been  carried out at provincial level, specifically to look at the level of co-
operation between veterinarian and communicable disease teams involved in in-
vestigations.  The focus was on the rapid assessment of exposure and on contact 
tracing, the use of individual protection, and the management of the contain-
ment measures.  
Comment
In human health sector : National exercises did not involve observers from outside 
the main Finnish authorities – such as panels of journalists.  The capacity of the 
Ministry of Interior to become involved in ensuring certain important issues in 
pandemic situations, such as security of stores and distribution of antivirals, should 
be tested by an exercise.  No major simulation exercise has been yet organized at 
provincial, hospital district and municipal levels.
In animal health sector : According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 
the new National Food Safety Agency “Evira” and a state provincial officer, there 
appears to be a good level of cooperation on outbreak control between both the 
human and animal health sectors at all levels. 
Recommendation
 In human health sector: In addition to the next national exercise, there is a 
need to organise simulation exercises for the regional and local level, focuss-
ing on the organizational needs of all the health care systems in the time of 
pandemic influenza.  
 The next national exercise should ensure the participation at national level 
of a variety of external observers (including the essential services from the 
non-health sector), and especially including the media, various levels of oth-
er health care workers and the general public/private sector, for their reac-
tions.  There is also a need for testing and modelling the impact of the main 
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non-pharmaceutical measures, such as school closure, on the intersectoral 
operations, including private firms and the private health sector.
 In animal health sector: national exercises need to be planned as an ongoing 
event, as these have been shown to be very useful in building on and contin-
uing to improve relationships and ensure more harmonized communication 
between human and animals sectors in an avian influenza outbreak.
 The exercises organised at national, regional and local level need to be suf-
ficiently spaced apart to allow assimilation of the lessons learnt and to avoid 
exhaustion of those doing the organising.  The work required to organise ex-
ercises should not be underestimated.  There needs to be a national mecha-
nism for measuring the effectiveness of each of these simulation exercises, 
drawing out the lessons learnt and then for improving the design of the next 
exercises.
 Exercises organised at an international or cross border level with neighbour-
ing countries should be considered.
10.   Intersectoral Response
Description
The MSAH provides the framework of the national pandemic plan.  The other 
ministries have their own basic plans incorporated into it, but they all also have 
their own more detailed plans prepared.  The intersectoral work is coordinated by 
the GMHP, which supports the MMPS.  The intersectoral cooperation takes place 
on all administrative levels from the Prime Minister´s Office to the command cen-
tres of municipalities (Appendix 1).  MSAH has also had several negotiations with 
a number of ministries and civil organizations about how to improve cooperation 
during a pandemic.
The emergency supplies maintained by the National Emergency Supply Agency 
(NESA) refer to state-owned drugs, pharmaceutical and raw materials procured 
to ensure security of supply in an effort to ensure the availability of so-called cri-
sis-specific drugs during a long-term crisis, mainly using the principle of compen-
satory production.  The stockpile is created on the basis laid out by the Act on 
Safeguarding Security of Supply (1390/1992).  NESA´s work is intersectoral and 
it even cooperates with the commercial sector.  It has several subdivisions, which 
strive for security on different sectors.  
At the provincial level, the planning and control is also intersectoral.  SPOs 
have Departments of Health and Social Affairs, Rescue, Education, Transport, Po-
lice, Consumer and can call on any other indispensable authorities and sections 
to the planning group (environmental authorities, frontier guards, military forces, 
customs, TV, broad casting, food deliverers etc).  These sectors can be also be rep-
resented at the provincial control (command) centre when needed.  Their health 
care plan is a part of a provincial plan and has been produced in close collaboration 
with the hospital districts, municipalities and provincial authorities headed by the 
Provincial Medical Officer.  At the provincial level the other members involved 
are the Provincial Veterinary Surgeon, Provincial Health Inspector and Forensic 
Medical Officer.  There should also be a representative from the private sector. 
The municipal level is described elsewhere.
Comment
The early identification of the so called ‘critical’ companies is an important step 
and their response to the letters sent to invite them to prepare their own detailed 
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contingency plans was very encouraging.  Most companies already had appointed 
a preparedness chief, while by 2006-2007 most businesses have prepared contin-
gency plans for ensuring that their activities are maintained in a pandemic.
The National Agency for Medicines is responsible for ensuring that all public 
hospitals, health centres and clinics have adequate stockpiles of basic medicines 
for use in emergencies (usually about 6 months consumption).  This includes the 
private sector pharmaceutical companies which should ensure that they have be-
tween 5-10 months of sales stock.  This is an excellent element of the national 
response and should be maintained in the long term.
General Transport:  On 22 February 2007, the Ministry of Transport and Com-
munications adopted guidelines on how their administrative sectors should pre-
pare for an influenza pandemic.  These guidelines include very good exercises to 
identify essential and priority routes, including such elements as a 5 months fuel 
stockpile.  The Ministry had already prepared pandemic contingency plans in 2006 
when an exercise was conducted for public administration on how to best coor-
dinate operations in the public and private sectors in a pandemic situation.  The 
most important businesses involved in transport and communications took part in 
the exercise.
Foreign Ministry:  the FM have their own central contingency plan which in-
cludes 112 recommendations.  Each foreign mission has developed its own pan-
demic plan – focusing on key functions to ensure business continuity throughout 
the pandemic.  The level of preparation here appears to be adequate.
Others: Nearly all of the key components of preparedness appear to have been 
worked out, with responsibilities between the various administrative levels and dif-
ferent sectors defined for the different pandemic threat phases, although the inter-
operability has not yet been fully tested in the exercises.  The preparedness of and 
collaboration with veterinarian sector (Phase 3-4) has been tested and works well. 
At the moment the planned level of preparedness at the agencies within the 
Ministry’s administrative sector is good or satisfactory.  The preparedness level in 
the businesses and companies varies, but with regard to the more important play-
ers it is at least satisfactory. 
Recommendation
 It is essential that the joint activities with the non-health sector continue to 
be organized with a view to maintain the interest and commitment of these 
sectors and also the private sector, in this important plan.
11.  Health System Response 
 (including Antivirals and Vaccine issues) 
Description 
The Hospital District (HD) assists the HC, the municipal organ responsible for 
combating infectious diseases, in the diagnostics of infectious diseases, in identify-
ing epidemics and in the surveillance of infections.  The HD directs the preven-
tion, surveillance and investigation of hospital infections in its area.  In addition to 
the duties indicated in the Communicable Diseases Act, the Hospital District is 
obliged to: ensure that any special medical services that may be required for treat-
ment of infectious diseases are available within the HD´s area and organise the 
necessary education and training for combating infectious diseases within the HD. 
There has been a general lack of specialists in infectious diseases and especially 
specialists trained in epidemiology, in the HDs.   KTL has started a limited field 
epidemiology training program to increase and improve these capacities. 
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1. A National antiviral strategy has been developed and it is updated up to De-
cember 2006.  According to the national preparedness plan, the patients will be 
provided with their medication (the antivirals from the governmental stockpile) 
from the local healthcare units.  The antiviral medicines stored at the licensed 
distributors will be delivered to these healthcare units as far as possible by normal 
logistic methods.  When the local authorities specify which healthcare units will 
be responsible for the influenza patients, the municipal preparedness plan for an-
tiviral logistic will adapt these changes into the regional and local operation envi-
ronments.  The NAM is responsible for the development and maintenance of this 
logistics plan, for practical guidance and for supervision of the distributors, retail 
pharmacies and hospital pharmacies operating in this field. 
The principles and rationale behind possible prioritization are described in 
the National Plan, but in practice the detailed clinical protocols would only be 
finalised once the exact type and nature of the pandemic influenza would be 
known.
2. The pandemic vaccination strategy, regulatory issues, liability and logistics are 
addressed in the national preparedness plan for an influenza pandemic.  A de-
tailed logistics and operational plan will be distributed through the Internet to the 
healthcare centres and to hospital pharmacies as soon as the pre-pandemic vaccine 
stock is in the warehouses in Finland. 
Finland has ordered sufficient supplies of pre-pandemic or prototype vaccine 
to inoculate the entire population.  This pre-pandemic vaccine will only be used 
once the pandemic is declared and a good cross-reactivity between the vaccine 
strain and the pandemic strain has been confirmed.  To boost the protection of the 
population, a second dose, this time using the specifically developed vaccine will 
be administered as soon as it is available. 
Finland has an advance purchase agreement with a private vaccine producer 
to secure the availability of 5.5 million doses pandemic vaccine approximately 6 
months after declaration of the pandemic.
Different protocols of vaccinations in different pandemics – two examples:
Moderate pandemic (as in 1957–58 or 1968–69)
1)  Personnel caring for infected patients (50,000–150,000 people).  
2)  Over-65s and those in seasonal influenza risk groups due to chronic condi-
tions (in 2005 approx. 1.1 million persons)
3)  0.5 7–64-year-olds not in risk groups (approx. 4.1 million persons). 
Possible prioritisation between these groups will be made early during the pan-
demic or during the immediately preceding alert phase, on the basis of the mor-
tality information collected.  Modification of the recommendations for seasonal 
influenza vaccination would be likely to be based on this ranking of vaccinations.
Severe pandemic (as in 1918–19)
1)  Personnel caring for infected patients (50,000–150,000 people). 
2)  Everyone else from the age of six months, from youngest to oldest.
Once the pandemic is declared, inoculations using the prototype vaccine will 
begin as quickly and comprehensively as possible, if there are stocks of suitable 
prototype vaccine at the start of the pandemic.  In Finland, the decision on us-
ing the prototype vaccine, the vaccination recommendations and the order to be 
applied are made by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health on the advice of 
the National Public Health Institute.  The vaccines must be distributed quickly 
7) Research shows that influenza vaccination results in a protective level of antibodies only 
 from the age of 6 months. 
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throughout Finland.  Local authorities have detailed plans in place for the practical 
aspects of the vaccination and for dissemination of information on them, so that 
the entire population can be vaccinated in a few weeks.  In municipalities, vac-
cinations may be carried out at different locations e.g. in health centres, hospitals, 
occupational healthcare, advisory health clinics, residential homes for the elderly, 
sheltered housing and community nursing, as well as possibly in schools
3. Protection of Health Care Workers (HCW), these have been prioritised in the 
national plan for preventive and therapeutic measures, should their availability be 
limited.  An ongoing discussion has raised the issue of prophylactic antivirals to 
HCW during a pandemic, and the standard of respiratory protective gear for HCW 
involved in assessing or treating (suspected) influenza patients.  There is a concrete 
risk of hospital districts making policy decisions on these issues that would be 
sufficiently diverse to cause major disruption in the HCW work force during a 
pandemic.  MSAH has nominated an expert group to give further national recom-
mendations on these issues by early 2008.
Comment
Vaccine policies and procurement:  The vaccination plan for an immediate first 
dose of pre-pandemic (H5N1) vaccine (to be stockpiled to be readily available) 
to be given to the whole population immediately the pandemic is declared and 
then to provide the targeted H5N1 pandemic vaccine again for all the population 
(5.2 million doses) is a sound one.  The pre-pandemic vaccine,  has been ordered, 
but at the time of assessment visit (June 2007) the timetable of the manufactur-
ing process was not yet known. A supply agreement for 5.5 million of the specific 
monovalent pandemic-strain vaccine has also been made, with the condition that 
this should arrive approximately six months after the phase six is announced.  This 
strategy, although a logical one, still relies on the premise that the pandemic strain 
will be sufficiently close to the present H5N1 for there to be some cross-immun-
iogenicity, which may not be the case.
A good vaccine distribution strategy and reasonable prioritisation plans (iden-
tifying in order of prioritisation the essential groups to be vaccinated first) are 
also in place.  The Health Centres also have their own plans on how to actually 
carry out the vaccination in a rapid manner.  The planned system for recognising 
adverse effects from either of the vaccines appears to be quite efficient.  The sys-
tem should pick up any adverse effects rather quickly, both for the H5N1 as well 
as for the pandemic, although right now the system cannot take the load nation-
ally.  This system could certainly be considered to be a Regional asset, as the early 
identification of suspected vaccine adverse effects findings would be relevant for 
many other countries in Europe.  A similarly efficient model is also available for 
the anti-virals, so Finland would be in a position to be amongst the first to evaluate 
the effectiveness and safety of the recommended medical interventions.
Anti-virals:  The present plans for the provision of anti-virals aim to provide a 
single course of treatment for 25% of the population, but it is still unclear whether 
the plans cover sufficiently any prophylactic indications or use, or repeated treat-
ment courses (false positive cases), both of which should be foreseen.  Apart from 
this the National Agency for Medicines has the overall supervision of a general lo-
gistic plan of anti-viral medicines and other pharmaceuticals for use in a pandemic, 
including stocks of antiviral medicines (oseltamivir, tsanamivir and amantadine), 
antibiotics, infusion equipment, etc.  This emergency stock of essential drugs and 
basic medical supplies is ensured through solid legislation, but the management of 
these stocks in case of problematic supply could perhaps be defined more explic-
itly.  Also regarding children – only normal capsules of anti-virals were available 
until now, but for the future smaller capsules should be ordered – but until then, 
32
the plans are to reconstitute anti-virals from the adult capsules for the paediatric 
treatment, not an ideal solution.  
The sub-national system of stockpiles as seen in one Region appeared to be 
well managed, however at the more local level it was less clear how these would 
be managed during Phase 6, particularly at the primary care level.  In general the 
central authorities need to be more assured that there are similarly robust mecha-
nisms in all the regions throughout the country. 
The system for on-line surveillance up of consumption is projected to be devel-
oped soon, and appears to be adequate.  There is the need to strengthen the sur-
veillance of the adverse drug reaction system.  The local plans for the distribution 
of the anti-virals, including visits at homes, appear to be good, but should prefer-
ably be further tested in simulations.  
Health Services: The basic plan is to channel flu patients to specific pandemic 
reception units.  Other plans include prioritising those health services that would 
need to be maintained during the peak of a pandemic.  These recognise the need 
to concentrate on the more acute treatments, logically freezing preventive and 
health care, chronic disease controls, etc., hoping to release staff from dental care, 
rehabilitation, etc., for use in other challenges and to meet the increased need for 
advice and information services.  There is a need to clearly identify and train now 
these ‘additional’ medical staff, and any non-medical staff who will be reallocated 
work in case of a pandemic.  The preparation of specific training materials will al-
low faster additional training during a crisis.  
The discussions with the Unions have been recognized to be necessary. They 
should  cover such delicate matters as the obligation to work in a pandemic, the 
level of personal protective equipment (common surgical mask vs HEPA) and so 
on, however these have not really been tackled fully. Discussions among staff dur-
ing local and regional planning have shown, that protection of health workers is a 
crucial issue. The level of protection should preferably be equal across the country.
It appears that the level of preparedness is not uniform throughout all levels of 
the health system.  Limited staff ratios and wide geographical coverage in many 
of the municipalities (particularly in the north), together with a different risk per-
ception at local levels, make it difficult to motivate staff in some places.  
Challenges to pharmaceutical preparedness:  The plans of the regional and local 
authorities specify the healthcare units that will be responsible for the influenza 
patients.  They also spell out how the antiviral medicines will be delivered - as far 
as possible using the normal logistic chains, but in a pandemic situation there are 
clear plans to prioritize and secure transportation.  The plans include how patients 
will get the antiviral medication from the local healthcare units together with in-
structions for purchasing other necessary medication.  These plans are adequate 
and appear to be clearly understandable, both for the pharmaceutical operators 
as well as the consumers.  There needs to be further thought to planning how to 
reduce any hoarding of pharmaceutical products and the risks of other pharma-
ceutical crimes.
Recommendation
 The local and regional level would surely benefit by being provided with 
stronger guidance from the national level on the implementation and fur-
ther development of their preparedness plans.  This could also serve to raise 
awareness on the importance of their preparedness planning and to ensure a 
more realistic insight into the consequences of a possible pandemic. 
 Although the plans for the emergency stock of drugs and medical equip-
ment provides a certain degree of security during a pandemic, the possible 
need for additional procurement needs to be studied and planned for. 
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 Planning and decisions on the details of possible prophylactic (especially for 
health care workers) or curative use of anti-virals during all pandemic phas-
es should be finalised and implemented. 
 Detailed plans on the practical problems (in terms of cold chain or waste 
management) of dealing with the enormous quantities of vaccines, especial-
ly their storage, should be finalised. 
 Other detailed plans to be further developed include the management of 
corpses and dealing with of extraordinarily large quantities of medical waste 
like protective equipment, needles, etc. 
 The use of operational modelling could be helpful to determine more pre-
cisely the anticipated needs in terms of human resources surge capacity.  The 
development of training materials for people with different medical or non-
medical backgrounds, to enable these to take on different functions during 
a pandemic response, should already be prepared from now, for faster im-
plementation when it is needed.  Training for certain target groups could al-
ready start now, which would raise a more broad awareness about additional 
resources that might be mobilised. 
 The sharing of preparedness plans between the same levels (regional or mu-
nicipal level) would certainly provide opportunities to learn from the strate-
gies and solutions presented in the other regions’ or municipals’ plans and 
should be encouraged more.  All levels should be motivated to regularly up-
date their preparedness plans, as well as to ensure their rapid implementa-
tion in the event they are needed.
 The region reviewed had clear and practical plans for the timely delivery of 
anti-virals to individual patients (including the home bound patients) in the 
event of a pandemic.  It is unclear whether there will be any central coordi-
nation of these plans which at present may vary from region to region.
12. Regional and Local Preparedness
Description
416 self-governing Municipalities provide citizens with basic services - 430 000 
employees serve municipal residents and more than half of the employees in the 
municipal sector work in social services and health care-; the Municipalities would 
become front-line public health actors and implementers in case of pandemics.
The municipalities have a multidisciplinary planning group responsible for de-
veloping the influenza pandemic plans, led by the municipal manager who is re-
sponsible for emergency planning. The health care planning group consist of the 
Chief Physician, Physician Responsible of Communicable Diseases (PCD), Vete-
rinarian, Chief Nurse, Health Inspector, Social Leader, representative from private 
medical care and NGOs etc. The municipalities can choose to prepare their plan 
alone or together with a neighbouring municipality or even several municipali-
ties can do it together. Pandemic preparedness planning should be included in the 
municipal emergency plan. Ministry of Social and Health Affairs has urged the 
municipalities to engage and integrate their pandemic planning to the regional 
process led by the Hospital Districts and State Provincial Offices.           
The SPO of the Province of Western Finland collected basic information about 
the pandemic planning from the HCs, Private Occupational Health Services and 
Hospital Districts.  This sort of investigation has not been carried out done in all 
SPOs yet. The greatest weakness identified is the lack of guidelines of the social 
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sector, which has an important role during a pandemic. Also the current reforms 
of the service structure, which aim to ensure that there will be at least 20 000 
inhabitants for the smallest area covered by the health care services, partly slows 
down the planning process. During the pandemic, the HCs´ services would need 
to have increased nursing staff for the offices and to meet on call advice. Over half 
of the HCs estimate that they would probably have problems in getting the requi-
red extra personnel during a pandemic. 29 per cent of the HCs estimated that the 
private health care could help in carrying out the vaccinations. 24 per cent estima-
ted that the private health care could probably provide nursing services against a 
fee. The Private Occupational Health Care is responsible for 250 000 employees´ 
health care. The POHC could help the HCs with the vaccinations and call advice. 
Some representatives of POHC have expressed interest and willingness to take 
part in the pandemic training.
Comment
Local and Regional implementation of the plan
It is a legal obligation (Emergency Powers Act, Health Protection Act) for state and 
municipal authorities to ensure, by means of emergency plans and prior planning 
for emergencies, that their services will continue to be performed also in emer-
gency situations.  The MSAH and Health Care Departments of State Provincial 
offices can offer guidance, direction and monitoring of the preparedness planning, 
but they have no authority to issue any binding orders to municipalities who enjoy 
a high degree of autonomy. 
However in a pandemic the local authorities will be the front-liners.  Most of 
the expertise below the national level is based at the hospitals on the regional 
level, as the level of planning is less advanced at the Health Centers – where sev-
eral have lagged behind.  The role of the Association of Finnish Local and Regional 
Authorities to improve coordination and cooperation between municipalities is 
an important one.  They need to help develop plans on how to shift from normal 
service delivery to a pandemic level of cover.  Also the provinces themselves have 
a strong tradition of working together on preparedness plans (especially in the 
north) and this should be further encouraged.  There appears to be relatively good 
multisectoral collaboration at the provincial level, especially between the police, 
rescue, ambulance, education and social and health sector and veterinary who are 
involved in a regular meeting of the heads of these sections (which operates as a 
command center for emergencies).
Regarding communication needs, the municipalities are each responsible for 
their own communication.  This means that it may be possible that the prima-
ry health care and the Hospital Districts take care of their own communications, 
which may lead to some confusion during a pandemic.  Ideally the KTL will pre-
pare and send standard materials for use in regional and local communications, 
which the hospital districts on the regional level could use and adjust for the re-
gional and local context.  Provincial officers should ensure that the message doesn’t 
vary significantly from district to district. 
One of the main weaknesses identified at the local level is the lack of social care 
involvement, especially the social care focussing on vulnerable groups, who have not 
yet become fully involved in pandemic preparedness.  Also the general guides for 
the social care’s preparedness plans are old, in particular those referring to child day 
care and elderly care in the homes, nursing for disabled in their homes and meals on 
wheels services.  Their role in assisting to maintain some sort of home quarantine 
needs to be clarified. These all require specific plans as the National Preparedness 
Plan describes the role of social services only on very general level. 
The local and regional level authorities did recognise that they may need some 
guidance from the center to carry out simulations as there have been no simula-
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tion exercises at the local level.  Although there have been a few exercises at the 
university hospital level, these are recognised to have been insufficient.  There needs 
to be a team set up at the national level to help coordinate such regional exercises.  
The lack of well trained experts at the regional and local level is clear.  The KTL 
national field epidemiology training program, partially funded by the new prepared-
ness funds, prioritises initially the University Hospital District teams. Hospital Dis-
tricts will have 1-2 infectious disease specialists who have received  limited field or 
intervention epidemiology training.  This lack of expertise is especially acute in the 
more remote areas where there is a chronic lack of all doctors and nurses.  
The Health Centers are responsible for delivering much of the seasonal influenza 
vaccination programme and the one visited (Kangasala) was generally quite pleased 
with their uptake rate.  In a pandemic they appreciate that they will be very much 
involved in the pandemic vaccine delivery, once it arrives – although many HCs 
need to plan in more detail where and how these large stocks will be stored.
The primary care surveillance systems would be very stretched in a pandemic 
and there should be some further planning on how this can be made more auto-
mated, although the HC visited believed that they should be able to maintain all 
their normal computerised record keeping during the pandemic.
The provincial officers appear to have looked into the necessary cold storage for 
an excessive amount of corpses and there seems to be enough space capacity space 
for emergency situations. 
Several of the Regional (central) hospitals have developed models of service de-
mand in a pandemic, including how to increase further hospital capacity.  There are 
still some concerns about the stocks of the “routine” drugs used for intensive care 
(25% of total yearly consumption), IV-apparatus and other consumables, IV-elec-
tronics, IV-racks…, ‘hotel’ consumables: linen, food…, but especially reconstitution 
liquids (purchase, storage, post-pandemic needs), Ventilators / respirators.  There are 
still problems with how to select the right patients for admission to the hospitals 
but also with many other details like how to find enough well trained personnel, 
how to persuade professionals to do what they are not exactly trained to do, how to 
maintain order and discipline both in the community as a whole but also around the 
health care facilities especially, the effective and safe use of ”fever hospitals”, trans-
port between units (patients, relatives, drugs, materials, cadavers), etc.
Regarding the working ethics and conditions, there has not yet been consulta-
tion or agreement with the nursing unions on such issues like appropriate com-
pensation for the extra risks and work efforts in a pandemic. 
Recommendation
 The regions should consider appointing the regional (central) and  univer-
sity (central) hospitals as their main coordinator of communications in a 
pandemic, to minimise the possibility of potentially damaging conflicting 
messages emerging from the lower levels
 The local social care services caring for vulnerable groups (child day care, 
elderly care in the home, nursing for disabled in their homes, meals on 
wheels, etc) need to be encouraged to update and further develop their own 
preparedness plans.  
 Although many have been completed there are still some areas where re-
gional and local preparedness plans still need to be finalised, these should be 
completed as soon as possible.
 The regional and local level authorities need guidance from the national lev-
el to help them carry out effective preparedness simulations/exercises at the 
regional and local level.  There needs to be more regional and local exercises 
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undertaken, repeated in the other regions using the lessons learned, to im-
prove that exercise each time.
 The lack of well trained experts in Infectious Disease control at the regional 
(central hospital) and local level requires further investment in training.
 A variety of models for delivering anti-virals and vaccines in the most effec-
tive and safe manner should be explored and tested with operational model-
ling and small scale exercises in order to make a clear recommendation on 
the most appropriate method.  
 There needs to be more discussion with the health care workers unions and 
professional associations regarding the working ethics and conditions in a 
pandemic. 
13.  Large Cities Pandemic Preparedness
Description
The same guidelines apply to the large cities as to the smaller municipalities. The 
large cities however have better planning and manpower capacity. They may also 
have unique health care structures concerning the division between primary health 
care, secondary health care and tertiary health care.
In the municipal level  the health and social pandemic preparedness plans are 
done in close collaboration. They are integrated to the other plans in  municipali-
ties and cities. 
In Finland the obligation of local authorities to organize children´s day care is 
unchanged in a pandemic situation.
Comment
At the city level, there appears to be good structures in place to deal with a crisis 
such as a pandemic.  There is a ‘serious emergency office’ that is responsible for 
preparing business continuity plans, which usually refer to the central security ser-
vice guidelines.  The capital has prepared special preparedness plans with an inter-
sectoral co-operation scope, excellent antiviral and personal protective equipment 
protection policies and guidelines and an airport safety procedures and emergency 
plan.  The capital is the regional transportation hub and the place of work for 
many international commuters and its preparedness plan reflects this accordingly. 
Many cities have a Rescue Services coordinating body – led by their Mayor and 
includes many members from different sectors.  This  coordinating body covers 
pandemics and avian flu also and the discussions on the pandemic are led by the 
health sector of the city
Again a main concern at the city level refers to the problem of the care of chil-
dren – should they be forced to shut down the day care system.  Many of the 
health care workers are mothers and this decision will have serious effects on the 
workforce availability at a time of heightened need.
Recommendation
1. There needs to be more discussion on the decision regarding border restric-
tions in a pandemic with neighbouring countries.  A balanced approach 
should be the aim, so as not to deprive the capital of its vital international 
personnel or not to paralyse regional transportation. 
2. The national, regional and local plans should clearly anticipate the addition-
al burdens on the public health systems in the main cities (including such 
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delicate sites as the airports), and should prepare plans to assure business 
continuity.
3. There needs to be more crisis management exercises carried out at the deci-
sion making level in the capital, possibly with the health sector in a support-
ing but not decisive role.  These should serve to try to better delineate the 
competences and responsibilities between the public health institutions and 
the different crisis management institutions.
14. Regional and Local Public Health Manpower
Description
KTL gives expert support to Provincial Medical Officers and to the Communica-
ble Disease Experts (CDE) in Hospital Districts  (i.e. central hospitals). The last 
– mentioned will guide the Local Public Health Officers and especially the medi-
cal doctors responsible for the communicable diseases.  The field epidemiology 
training program will enhance the expertise of communicable diseases  in HD:
s and thus also make the education of the local health care workers possible. The 
number of the CDE’s as well communicable disease nurses at HD level is cur-
rently too small to allow full-scale epidemiological support to doctors responsible 
for communicable diseases in the health centres at the local level. Some improve-
ment is expected following ear-marked state financial incentives to HD’s  in the 
years 2006 and 2007.  The infectious disease education of all health workers and 
on all levels belongs to the pandemic plans. Large one day seminars have been held 
by KTL and provinces since 2006.
Comment
The provincial medical officers have an administrative role in epidemic/pandemic 
planning  At the municipality level, the Health Centre doctors carry out this func-
tion, although in general they are less well trained, while the veterinarian leads the 
epidemiological investigations when it involves food. Also the health inspector is 
involved in the tracing food- and water-borne epidemics.  Most contact tracing is 
carried out at the local level,  but KTL or the regional level central hospital infec-
tious disease teams also advice, assist and coordinate part of the contact tracing if 
required.
Clearly at the local level there is too few personnel with the right public health 
skills - well trained personnel are central to any local public health response.  This 
is of greater concern as in a pandemic there will be limited possibilities for ‘mutual 
aid’ (one neighbouring area assisting another) as every area will be stressed.  
Recommendation
 Authorities should continue to support the field epidemiology training pro-
gramme so as to strengthen regional and public health capacity that could 
be utilised in a pandemic.
15. Hospital Preparedness
Description
Under the Communicable Diseases Act, direction of the work of combating infec-
tious diseases within its territory is the duty of the Hospital District ( Central Hos-
pital functioning on the Regional level, ), which also acts as regional expert adviser 
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on combating infectious diseases and monitors execution of such work in its area. 
The Hospital District assists the municipal organ responsible for combating infec-
tious diseases in diagnosing infectious diseases, identification of epidemics and in 
trace-back  infections. It also directs prevention, surveillance and investigation of 
hospital infections in its area. In addition to the duties indicated in the Communi-
cable Diseases Act, as obligations under the same Act the HD must: - ensure that 
special medical services required for treatment of infectious diseases are available 
within the its area; organise the necessary education and training for combating in-
fectious diseases within the HD; participate in development of measures to com-
bat infectious diseases within the  HD; provide, on demand, summary details of 
notified infectious diseases registered in the health centre catchment area.
Comment 
The regionally functioning Central Hospitals will take the substance lead in a pan-
demic on their HD. Among them, the University Hospitals, comprising larger pop-
ulations, will act as opinion leaders.  The level of knowledge and expertise in the 
dedicated infectious diseases of those University Central Hospital specialists met 
was excellent.  There was less confidence in the degree of expertise at the local 
health care level or of their knowledge of preparedness in the general.
Some University hospitals have prepared good detailed models, including vari-
ous estimates of the potential severity of disease and even clinical protocols/indi-
cations for admissions, intensive care, etc.  The model presented to the assessment 
team was based on a pandemic scenario presented in the national preparedness 
plans, with a severity  between the 1918 pandemic and the ‘Hong Kong’ and ‘Asian 
pandemics’, and that there would be about 30 days ‘warning’ to implement meas-
ures and guidelines before the strain enters the Finnish population.  The plans pre-
sented were very detailed and included measure such as shifting personnel from 
non-urgent care clinics, suspension of leave, recruitment of students and re-train-
ing of other professionals, recruitment of the voluntary sector also, etc.  The re-
gional plan estimates that the full vaccination initiative could be completed within 
1 week, although the plans regarding the storage and distribution of the vaccine 
need to be further elaborated.  Stockpiles for medicines have been ordered, as 
have the personal protective equipment, based on detailed estimates of how many 
masks would be required per patient.  There are still some concerns about certain 
details such as the numbers of ventilators needed or the additional storage space 
required for the volume of stockpiled reconstitution liquids, all of which have still 
not been solved.  
Most of the hospital district plans have been prepared, but many municipalities’ 
plans still need to be finalised and then tested in simulations exercises.  In fact few 
local multisectoral exercises have been conducted. 
Recommendation 
 There should be several pandemic models devised that can be used by hos-
pitals in their planning process, particularly for the pandemic peaks (phase 
6), and which include such aspects as how the hospitals will protect their 
staff, provide essential services and deal with the severely ill influenza pa-
tients.  
 The regional (central) hospital plans need to be harmonised as much as pos-
sible, in particular on such aspects as the selection of cases for admission, 
training needs for professionals to carry out work that they are not trained 
to do during the pandemic peaks and other non-health aspects as how best 
to maintain order in the community as a whole as well as parking around 
the hospital, etc,. 
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 More regional and local exercises need to be carried out to specifically test the 
Hospital District level plans as well as the multisectoral municipalities’ plans.  
16.  Interoperability Issues
Description
The Nordic countries signed the Nordic Public Health Preparedness Agreement in 
2002. The Agreement commits the Nordic countries to mutual social and health-
care cooperation in crisis and catastrophic situations, taking into account national 
needs. A widespread influenza pandemic does constitute a crisis situation as de-
fined in the Agreement.
The agenda of Finland’s presidency of the Nordic Council of Ministers in 2007 
includes active promotion of Nordic cooperation in issues related to vaccines and a 
possible pandemic. There is currently an initiative which is looking into exploring 
the production of a possible common Nordic influenza vaccine. 
The plans of the neighbouring Nordic countries are shared and available, but 
those for Russia not.  
The members of the European Union are legally obliged to participate in the 
Early Warning Response System (EWRS) of communicable diseases and Finland 
also contributes to this system. 
Comment
There has been a good level of collaboration between the Nordic countries on 
specific issues of pandemic preparedness such as on the establishment of a Nordic 
influenza vaccine production, and there is a good exchange of information of the 
pandemic preparedness plans of the Nordic countries.  Experience from elsewhere 
has shown that sharing plans with neighbouring countries is useful as there is al-
ways something that countries can learn from each other.  There has been little 
collaboration with the other neighbouring countries like Estonia and none at all 
with the Russian Federation despite the large border and the close proximity of 
the two countries.  
This should be tackled in the near future as there are particular concerns over 
the likelihood of asymmetric responses in a pandemic between Finland and its 
neighbours, which may lead to public confusion and specific difficulties during the 
pandemic.
Recommendation
 It is recommended that the country continues to share and obtain more 
knowledge about the pandemic preparedness plans of all the neighbouring 
countries (including non-EU countries as these countries are likely to have 
a different approach to pandemic preparedness than EU countries) in order 
to identify differences and similarities (e.g. in policies regarding protective 
measures offered to the population).  
 Finland should strive to acquire a better knowledge of the Russian prepar-
edness measures and take into consideration what different policies (such 
as protective measures recommendations for the general public) in the two 
countries could mean before and during a pandemic.  This should also be 
addressed on provincial and municipal levels for provinces and municipali-
ties that border the Russian Federation.  
 There should be specific bilateral discussions with neighbouring states to 
discuss interoperability issues and how these can be overcome.
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17.  Communications
There are plans addressing Communication Aspects in the National Plan (Chapter 
13).  The main party responsible for communications is the MSAH, in coopera-
tion with departments and agencies in its sector, particularly the KTL, which is 
responsible for planning and directing communications concerning the pandemic 
alert and pandemic. 
Each Ministry is responsible for providing for the particular communications 
needs within its own administrative sector during the pandemic. There are system-
atic procedures for cooperation between the Ministries’ communications units and 
these are appended to each Ministry’s preparedness plans concerning communica-
tions during a pandemic. 
Responsibility for communications always lies with the responsibility for di-
recting operations. If the responsibility for directing pandemic preparedness and 
a pandemic situation is transferred from the MSAH to the Government then the 
responsibility for communications would also pass to the Communications Unit of 
Prime Minister’s Office.   
In a pandemic situation, it is very important to ensure good regional and local 
communications. The general public should have very detailed instructions and 
information for example on the places of treatment.  Such information must be 
provided at as local a level as possible, preferably by the local authority.  SPOs, 
Hospital Districts and Health Centres should ensure that regional and local com-
munications plans regarding a pandemic are included in the preparedness plans.
The target of communications are: general population, social and health service 
professional personnel, members of the media at home and abroad, personnel of 
each administrative sector (internal communications) and various interest groups. 
The channels of communication are: mass media, Internet, Telefax, telephone hel-
plines, replying to letters and emails from the public, printed information for dis-
tribution at every home, school or workplace,  and paid advertising.
The details of the national communication plan is still being developed together 
with MSAH and KTL. The plan is expected to be finalized by the end of 2007.  
Comment
The concept that at the central level, the authority (member of the Heads of Pre-
paredness) designated to be responsible for coordinating that particular emergency 
response operations (in case of a pandemic this would be the Ministry of Social Af-
fairs and Health) would also be responsible for the communications is a good one. 
It is important that every other Ministry involved in the response (e.g. Ministry of 
Interior or Foreign Affairs) does continue to maintain its own separate pandemic-
related communication plans.  However the danger that several communication 
channels and sources of information suddenly open up during a pandemic, reveal-
ing different levels of competencies giving varying advice and messages would be 
very damaging – so it is important to ensure coherency in front of the media and 
the political pressures.
The procedure that in serious emergencies the other Ministries’ communica-
tions directors meet and discuss these communication strategies is also very im-
portant.   At the regional and municipal levels, it is appropriate that the KTL is 
responsible for the internal communications within the health care system and 
provides guidance on what to could be communicated with the media on this 
crisis.  Coordination of the communication at municipal level is ensured by the 
State Provincial Medical Officers.  This entire system appears to be reasonable 
well thought out and should operate well in a pandemic.  
The communications plans presented correspond reasonably well to what would 
be expected, however it is unclear whether there is sufficient ‘surge capacity’ (in 
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terms of numbers of trained personnel) that would be needed for all the commu-
nications workload in a pandemic.
Recommendation
 The main communication messages to be used at various levels should al-
ready be developed at this stage for the different scenarios.  This includes 
the communication lines to be used for health professionals at regional and 
municipal level, as well as for the general public and media.  For the latter, 
the planned use of a single governmental web portal, dedicated to influen-
za, would be an efficient tool to ensure coherent communication messages 
countrywide.  
 The central role that will be taken up by KTL, in close collaboration with 
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, in determining the main commu-
nication lines during a pandemic, could be more emphasised in the national 
preparedness plan. 
 The possibility of establishing a group to further develop communication 
strategies in anticipation of needs in a  crisis should be considered.
 Investigate how best to provide the general public with the means to cope 
with illnesses and improve their own empowerment  (such as self-diagnosis, 
possibly telemedicine facilities, on-line psycho-social support, etc). 
18.  Avian Influenza
The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) and, at regional level, the SPOs, 
have drawn up detailed operational instructions for veterinarians to deal with avi-
an influenza. 
The Finnish Food Safety Authority (Evira) screens for avian influenza antibodies 
in poultry and for the incidence of the virus in wild birds, as well as mapping the 
risk factors of avian influenza.  In the event of a disease cluster on a poultry farm, 
the prevention of the further spread of disease and the disease eradication is the 
responsibility of the MAF and is regulated by the Decision on Control of Newcas-
tle Disease and Avian Influenza (3/EEO/96).  If necessary decisions can be made 
on the emergency vaccination of poultry.  This sector has plans and is prepared for 
any transmission of avian influenza to humans and a possible new pandemic with 
human-to-human transmission, in cooperation with the MSAH. 
The Customs and similar other relevant sectors have been informed on the need 
for import bans imposed on poultry and foodstuffs posing a potential risk of infec-
tion. Similarly import licences for caged birds from infected areas are not granted. 
The MAF Press and Information Unit has prepared a communications plan in 
case of avian influenza, and maintains a communications ‘code of practice’ for cri-
sis and emergency situations. In addition, the MAF maintains a constantly updated 
avian influenza website on the Internet. 
A media seminar on avian influenza was held in The National Food Safety (and 
Veterinary) Agency (Evira) on February 14th 2007. The media has published in-
formation at end of May 2007, when keeping poultry outdoors was again allowed; 
there is information on Evira's web site available continuously.
A joint human and veterinary exercise has been held in March 2006. Also other 
training sessions for contingency veterinarians has been held.
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19.  Human Avian Influenza and Avian Influenza (H5N1) Issues
The response to the threat of avian influenza falls under the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and its new National Food Safety – Evira. 
This is responsible for the coordination of the work of provincial Veterinary Offic-
ers (25), contingency veterinarians (82) and Municipal Veterinary Officers (313). 
It relies on the good cooperation of the farmers, who are obliged to notify any 
symptoms of disease to a veterinarian (Act of Animal Diseases).  There are good 
systems in place for the surveillance in poultry and wild birds, veterinarian disease 
reporting, sampling and analysis processes, immediate local restrictive measures 
for containment and the provision of protective equipment.  All these systems 
include provisions for working in conjunction with the local health care authority, 
and where necessary, with HD infectious disease team, state provincial medical 
officer, provincial veterinary, provincial health inspector and the national epide-
miologic team from KTL.  Cooperation between animal and human health fields 
seems well established at provincial, HD and local level.
Several detailed contingency plans/manuals of operations have been prepared. 
There is a good provincial contingency plan, that includes a specific part for avian 
influenza (revised in 2006) including the duties, responsibility and updated con-
tacts for every sector (police, military, health sector).  The has been a large scale 
national exercise in 2004 for Newcastle disease (a very similar plan as for the avian 
influenza) and since then there have been several provincial exercises. 
The recommendations from the European commission on AI have been fol-
lowed since 2003 ; in 2006, 2133 samples have been analysed, 41 found positive 
serologically in two farms (and containment was effected) but no virus was found. 
In 2006, there was no positive test in any of the wild birds tested.  The Evira risk 
assessment for last two years have led the ministry to order the restriction of out-
door poultry during spring.
Recommendation
 The Evira appears to be a well organised agency for risk assessment, to pro-
vide or revise standard operating procedures and recommendations for avian 
influenza or any zoonotic disease.  Even closer collaboration with the KTL 
then at present is recommended. 
20.  Specific Country Issues
Comment
The small size of the central team responsible for leading the process of pandemic 
preparedness is now becoming a handicap to the progress in the development of 
preparedness.  This will become even more apparent in a federal-style country 
where the central capacity has to focus more on a coordinating role, forming con-
sensus with a large number of partners, rather than employing a more simplified 
command and control model.  Also the small size of this team means that it is un-
likely that they will have the time and capacity to develop the documents needed 
and carry out the work with all the groups that need to be mobilised. 
Recommendation 
 The external team members recommend that the national authorities con-
sider how they can reinforce/enlarge the central team for the next two to 
three years, when the more detailed preparedness work will need to be un-
dertaken by the country.  
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ANNEXES
Annex 1. Timetable assessment of influenza, pandemic and avian influenza 
preparedness in country
Tuesday 12 June 2007
Introduction: the Finnish health care system and national pandemic infl uenza preparedness
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, meeting room Meritulli, Meritullinkatu 8, Helsinki 
Chair: Mr. Tapani Melkas, Director, Department of Health, MSAH
NB. Additional meeting room 5D Debet has been reserved for the ECDC 
team 9.00-16.15. Room has wireless internet connection. 
10.00  Welcome 
 Mr. Ilkka Oksala, Secretary of State of the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
 Health 
 
10.30  Introduction: the Finnish health care system and 
 the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health
 Mr. Tapani Melkas, Director, Department of Health, MSAH (max. 15 min)
11.00 Introduction: the national pandemic infl uenza preparedness
Mr. Tapani Melkas, Director, Department of Health, MSAH (max 5min)
Mr. Petri Ruutu, Head of Department, National Public Health Institute 
(max 5min)
Mr. Jouko Söder, Ministerial Counsellor, Health Affairs, MSAH (max 5min)
Mr. Raimo Ikonen, Director-General, Finance and Planning Department, 
MSAH (max 5min) 
  
12.00-13.30  Lunch, Restaurant Rodolfo 
Tuesday 12 June 2007: 
Governmental coordination and State level resource management for pandemic preparedness
The Prime Minister’s Offi ce, Helsinki, meeting room Konselji 
Chair: Mr. Risto Volanen, State Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Offi ce
13.30 Governmental coordination of preparedness: 
Structures of preparedness on the government level, 
Heads of Preparedness: actions concerning pandemic preparedness
Mr. Risto Volanen, State Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Offi ce 
Mr. Timo Härkönen, Head of Government Security, Prime Minister’s 
Offi ce
15.15 Coffee
14.30  State level resource management for pandemic preparedness
Resource management for pandemic preparedness (max 5min)
Mr. Mika Purhonen, Director General, National Emergency Supply Agency 
The National Emergency Supply Agency (max 5min)
Mr. Riku Juhola, Special Adviser, National Emergency Supply Agency 
Municipal resourses for pandemic preparedness (max 5min)
Mr. Jussi Merikallio, Director, Social Welfare and Health Care, 
The Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities
Ms. Liisa-Maria Voipio-Pulkki, Senior Medical Adviser, 
The Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities
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Current status of preparedness on provincial level and future needs 
(max 5min)
On behalf of all invited State Provincial Medical Offi cers: 
Ms. Hannele Havanka, State Provincial Medical Offi cer, 
The State Provincial Offi ce of Oulu 
16.00  Preparedness through different sectors in municipal level 
 Case: City of Helsinki
 Aaro Toivonen, Risk Management Chief, City of Helsinki
 
16.30  End of the day
Wednesday 13 June 2007: Technical aspects of pandemic infl uenza preparedness
National Public Health Institute, Mannerheimintie 166, Helsinki, Meeting room A3, third fl oor 
Chair: Ms. Merja Saarinen, Ministerial Counsellor, Health Affairs, MSAH
08.30  Preparedness on Infl uenza in Animals 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (max 5 min)
Ms. Riitta Heinonen, Deputy Director General, 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
Finnish Food Safety Authority Evira(max 10 min)
Ms. Jaana Husu-Kallio, Director General, Evira
Ms. Sirpa Kiviruusu, Senior Veterinary Offi cer, Evira 
Ms. Saara Raulo, Head of Zoonosis Centre, Evira
Discussion 
9.30  Preparedness at the Ministry level: two cases 
The pandemic preparedness under the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications
The Ministry of Transport and Communications (max 5 min)
Mr. Seppo Öörni,  The Ministry of Transport and Communications
Finavia (max 5 min)
Ms. Silja Laakkonen, Legal Advisor, Finavia
Discussion
The pandemic preparedness under the Foreign Ministry 
Mr. Pasi Tuominen, Counsellor, Foreign Ministry of Finland (max 5 min)
Mr. Jussi Tanner, First Secretary, Foreign Ministry of Finland 
Discussion
15.15 Coffee
10.30  Expert guidance for health care services 
Preparedness of clinical surveillance and health care system 
Preparedness of virological surveillance
Vaccine policies and procurement
Mr. Pekka Puska, Director General, National Public Health Institute (KTL) 
Mr. Petri Ruutu, Head, Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, 
KTL
Ms. Terhi Kilpi, Head; Department of Vaccines, KTL 
Mr. Thedi Ziegler, Department of Virology and molecular medicine, KTL 
12.30 – 13.30  Lunch, National Public Health Institute
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13.30 Occupational safety and pandemic preparedness 
Finnish Institute of Occupational Health FIOH (max 5 min)
Ms. Helena Taskinen, team leader, Health and Work Ability 
The Department for Occupational Safety and Health, MSAH (max 5 min)
Mr. Leo Suomaa, Director, MSAH
Mr. Heikki Savolainen, Ministerial Counsellor, Health Affairs, MSAH
Discussion
14.15  Anti-viral and other pharmaceutical preparedness and logistical planning 
Mr. Hannes Wahlroos, Director General, National Agency for Medicines 
NAM 
Ms. Eija Pelkonen, Head of Inspectorate, Department of Enforcement & 
Inspection, National Agency for Medicines NAM
Discussion
14.45  Coffee
15.00-16.30 Public Health Measures, Prof. Angnus Nicoll 
16.30 –18.30  Possibility for internal evaluation team meeting 
     National Public Health Institute, Meeting room A3
19.00-21.30   Dinner Cruise in the archipelago of Helsinki 
     Departure from the Market Square, m/s Natalia
Thursday 14 June 2007: Local and regional implementation
City of Tampere
7.30 Train from the Helsinki central railway station 
 Conference cabin reserved for the ECDC team (max 7 pers.)
09.00  Arrival to the city of Tampere 
09.30  Local and Regional implementation of the national pandemic infl uenza 
 preparedness plan
 Tampere University Hospital, hallituksen kokoushuone
Local implementation and regional governmental monitoring 
(max 10 min)
On behalf of State Provincial Medical Offi cers 
Ms. Maarit Varjonen-Toivonen, MD and Mr. Simo Harju, MD, 
State Provincial Offi ce of Western Finland:
Jukka Lumio, MD, PhD, Head of Infectious Diseases, 
Pirkanmaa hospital district  
Preparedness on the municipal level (max 10 min)
Mr. Jarmo Salmi, Risk Management Chief, City of Tampere 
10.30  Preparedness on the hospital district level 
 Jukka Lumio, MD, PhD, Head of Infectious Diseases, 
 Pirkanmaa hospital district  
 - Specialized medical care
 - Regional cooperation
 - Hospital hygiene
 - Ward for Infectious Diseases 
 - Laboratory Centre 
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12.00- 14.00  Lunch and transfer to the Health care centre of City of Kangasala 
 (20 min) 
14.00  Preparedness on the primary health care centre level 
 Health care centre, City of Kangasala
Ms. Tuuli Löfgren, Head Physician responsible for pandemic preparedness, 
Health care centre, Municipality of Kangasala
16.00  Train from the Tampere railway station 
 Conference cabin reserved for the ECDC team (max 7 pers.)
17.30 Arrival in Helsinki 
Friday 15 June 2007: Conclusions
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Meritullinkatu 8, Helsinki, meeting room 4D Debet 
Room has wireless internet connection.
09.00  Opportunity for additional questions 
Experts available include: 
Ms. Merja Saarinen, Ministerial Counsellor, Health Affairs, MSAH 
Mr. Petri Ruutu, Department Head, National Public Health Institute 
Mr. Jouko Söder, Ministerial Counsellor, Health Affairs, MSAH 
Conclusions and light lunch
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, meeting room Barometri
 
12.15  Ms Liisa Hyssälä, Minister of Social Affairs and Health
12.30  Mr. Kari Välimäki, Permanent Secretary, MSAH
13.30  End of the visit 
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Annex 2. Participants of country assessment visit
External Team Members
• Dr. Andrew Amato – Dep. Head, Surveillance Unit, ECDC
• Dr. Evelyn Depoortere – Epidemiologist, Preparedness and Response 
Unit, ECDC
• Prof Angus Nicoll – Infl uenza Coordinator, ECDC
• Dr Stephane Veyrat - Département des situations d'urgence sanitaire
Direction générale de la santé, Ministère de la santé et des solidarités
• Ms Beatrice Toussaint - expert END, C3-health threats, Euro Comm
• Ms Michala Hegermann-Lindencrone – CD Sur. and Resp. WHO 
European Region 
  
Internal Team Members
• Dr. Merja Saarinen – Ministerial Counsellor, Health/Medical Affairs, 
Health Dep., Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.
• Prof. Petri  Ruutu - Director/Research professor, Department of 
Infectious Disease Epidemiology, National Public Health Institute.
• Dr.  Jouko Söder, Head of the Preparedness Unit, The Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health.
• Dr. Leena Soininen, Temporary Consultant for pandemic preparedness 
for MSAH, 
• Ms. Martta Forsell, Project Coordinator for the national health project, 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.
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Annex 3. Persons met
Day 1
Mr. Tapani Melkas, Director, Department of Health, MSAH
Mr. Ilkka Oksala, Secretary of State of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
Mr. Raimo Ikonen, Director-General, Finance and Planning Department, MSAH (max 
5min) 
Mr. Risto Volanen, State Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Offi ce
Mr. Timo Härkönen, Head of Government Security, Prime Minister’s Offi ce
Mr. Mika Purhonen, Director General, National Emergency Supply Agency 
Mr. Riku Juhola, Special Adviser, National Emergency Supply Agency 
Mr. Jussi Merikallio, Director, Social Welfare and Health Care, The Association of 
Finnish Local and Regional Authorities
Ms. Liisa-Maria Voipio-Pulkki, Senior Medical Adviser, The Association of Finnish Local 
and Regional Authorities
Ms. Hannele Havanka, State Provincial Medical Offi cer, The State Provincial Offi ce of 
Oulu Aaro Toivonen, Risk Management Chief, City of Helsinki
Day 2
Ms. Merja Saarinen, Ministerial Counsellor, Health Affairs, MSAH
Ms. Riitta Heinonen, Deputy Director General, The Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry 
Ms. Jaana Husu-Kallio, Director General, Evira
Ms. Sirpa Kiviruusu, Senior Veterinary Offi cer,Evira 
Ms. Saara Raulo, Head of Zoonosis Centre, Evira
Mr. Seppo Öörni,  The Ministry of Transport and Communications
Ms. Silja Laakkonen, Legal Advisor, Finavia
Mr. Pasi Tuominen, Counsellor, Foreign Ministry of Finland (max 5 min)
Mr. Jussi Tanner, First Secretary, Foreign Ministry of Finland 
Mr. Pekka Puska, Director General, National Public Health Institute (KTL) 
Ms. Terhi Kilpi, Head; Department of Vaccines, KTL 
Mr. Thedi Ziegler, Department of Virology and molecular medicine, KTL 
Ms. Helena Taskinen, team leader, Health and Work Ability 
Mr. Leo Suomaa, Director, MSAH
Mr. Heikki Savolainen, Ministerial Counsellor, Health Affairs, MSAH
Mr. Hannes Wahlroos, Director General, National Agency for Medicines NAM 
Ms. Eija Pelkonen, Head of Inspectorate, Department of Enforcement & Inspection, 
National Agency for Medicines, NAM
Ms. Maarit Varjonen-Toivonen and Mr. Simo Harju, State provincial Medical Offi cers, 
State Provincial Offi ce of Western Finland:
Mr. Jukka Lumio, MD, PhD, Head of Infectious Diseases, Pirkanmaa hospital district  
Mr. Jarmo Salmi, Risk Management Chief, City of Tampere 
Ms. Tuuli Löfgren, Head Physician responsible for pandemic preparedness, Health care 
centre, Municipality of Kangasala
Day 3
Mr. Seppo Simula, Chief super intendent, Police department, Ministry of Interior
Ms Liisa Hyssälä, Minister of Social Affairs and Health
Mr. Kari Välimäki, Permanent Secretary, MSAH
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Annex 4. Documents presented
Advance Reading Material:  
National preparedness plan for an infl uenza pandemic. Helsinki 2007. Publications 
of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 2007:10
Social Welfare and Health Care Preparedness in case of Exceptional Situations in 
Finland, brochures 2006:5eng
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Annex 5. Completed assessment tool (Section A only)
See separate document. 
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Appendix 1. Flow of data and information in NIDR
Source: KTL
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Appendix 2. 
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Appendix 3. Suspected food- or waterborne outbreak
Source: KTL
